Two fundamental problems in agricultural markets result in the inability of agriculture to arrive a long run economic equilibrium. The first, yield variability, has been address in separate papers. The second, structural excess capacity, is the subject of this blog.
INTRODUCTION
"I clearly recognize that in the long run every economic evil creates its own cure. If prices of farm products continue sufficiently long enough below cost of production, there will eventually be forced into bankruptcy enough farmers so that there will be no longer a disastrous surplus. At the same time there will be readjustments of land values, wages, etc., which will lower the production costs. Economic affairs always work themselves out if you leave them alone. However, it is equally certain that they will work themselves out even though you tamper with them. The disadvantage of tampering is that those who do the tampering are likely to be reviled by about half the population." Henry A. Wallace, Dec.28, 1922 (17).
Discussions, seminars, and symposiums have been conducted prior to consideration of every new farm bill. For the most part, the arguments focused on the desirability of providing for a market orientation in agriculture, although there has not been agreement on the meaning of market orientation. During the discussions, the term has been allowed to remain ambiguous, perhaps in the hope that consensus could be reached without clarity of definition. However, lack of an agreed upon definition of market orientation and a clear statement of the intent of commodity programs, has made it difficult to determine how to modify programs to achieve a more market oriented condition or, to determine how non-market oriented diverges from the "norm" or standard of perfect competition.
Digression on Programs vs Policies
What we call farm policy is, instead, a collection of programs to control price, hold stocks, and transfer income. In fact, the only consistent aspect of the programs has been the attempt to support incomes. The record of the programs, as they have been administered over their 40 year history, is that they have provide a price floor for program commodities and this floor has resulted in excess production which was stored and which resulted in attempts to reduce production. The net result was that incomes and asset values were higher than they would have been in the absence of the programs. From the record, one would conclude that the major goal of the programs was to keep income above free market levels. Despite this, however, protection against price variability has often been cited as a major objective. But no consistent policy has been articulated by Congress, farm groups or the several Administrations since the 1930's. The collection of programs has been variously interpreted by economist and policy analysts as providing income support, price stability, protecting the food supply, and protecting the family structure of agriculture.
The argument has been frequently made that current commodity programs are not working(12). However, since no statement of purpose has been articulated for the programs, it is difficult to evaluate how well they are or are not performing. The evidence available suggest that the cost of the programs has been higher than some thought desirable. Also the benefits of the programs went to producers with large farms. And, programs supported income but did little to lessen price variability or provide for stable budget cost. In fact, it is the variability and size of the program budget that appears to have been at issue rather than the effectiveness of the income transfer or the effectiveness of the program in achieving market stability.
This paper identifies issues associated with commodity policy; develops a rationale for and suggests a possible definition of market orientation; examines how the sector would behave under market orientation; evaluates the process of transition; and evaluates whether there is a continuing need for Government involvement in agriculture, because of the potential for market failure. No attempt is made to provide empirical estimates of the effects of alternative programs. These will be reserved for succeeding reports. This report relies on economic theory to suggest interactions and directions.
COMPETITIVE MARKETS
Competitive markets are a norm or standard by which economists measure economic performance. The argument is made that only in cases of market failure would an economy be better off with Government intervention. The pressure to move to market orientation stems from a belief that competitive markets are effective, efficient and equitable allocators of resources and output. That is, competitive markets will result in just the right amount of resources used to produce just the right amount of a commodity with equitable compensation for resources.
Past intervention by Government to support incomes of certain groups of producers above market clearing levels was based on the premise that market failure caused incomes in the farm sector to be below those in the non farm sector. It was deemed equitable, therefore, to provide a larger income to farmers by transferring it from taxpayers and consumers. Presently there is considerable debate over whether these income transfers should continue. That is, over whether commodity producers still deserve a larger share of the pie or whether the actions of Government to support producer incomes is causing the sector to be less profitable than it would be under free market conditions. Also at issue is whether there is a role for the Government to provide for market stability even if it does not provide for an income transfer. And, if market stability is a concern how can it be provided?
Some farm groups tend to support continued income transfers to the sector and in particular to producers of specific commodities. Others tend to suggest that the sector is no longer deserving of income transfers but rather deserves some protection from the capriciousness of the market which comes about through variability induced by weather and by the actions of foreign Governments (17).
Although it is often argue that a market orientation will strengthen agriculture, there is considerable evidence that making agricultural production more competitive may not be good for the sector in either the short run or the long run. McCalla and Carter, citing Dorfman, Samuelson, Josling and Galbraith; argue that "... if ... production agriculture is a competitive island surrounded by varying degrees of concentration in markets, then deducing conclusions about the advantage of a return to a free market from theoretical constructs may not be valid"(8). They argue that the evidence is not clear that agriculture will be better served by a return to a free market. Also, it is not clear that domestic consumers would benefit.
There dose seem to be agreement, among those involved in the debate, that a market oriented agriculture does not mean a total withdrawal of Government from commodity markets. What is missing, however, is a reason why continued involvement of the Federal Government would be required or why it would contribute to better market performance.
Market Signals from Competitive Markets
Most economists suggest that it would be desirable for the market to pass the appropriate economic signals through to producers concerning the quantity of resources to use in the production of commodities and, by inference, how much to produce. They also suggest that it would be desirable for signals to be sent to the consumer about how much to consume. The type of signal to be sent is seldom specified but most infer that prices are the appropriate mechanism to provide the signal. In a free and competitive market, where no buyer or seller is large enough to affect the market price and where everyone has equal and perfect information, output will be allocated among consumers efficiently by the changing market price signals. The market price adjusts to bring about an equilibrium between the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded. That is, it provides the signal that adjustments must be made. However, this theoretical framework assumes perfect knowledge and instantaneous adjustment to equilibrium which is simultaneous for long run and short run positions, ie., there is no short run. Capital, labor and current expenditures adjust so that no excess resources are used in production.
Non Simultaneity of Price and Quantity Changes
The market for farm commodities has several aspects that depart from the rigid assumptions of the perfect market. Specifically, imperfect knowledge; production and consumption do not adjust simultaneously; production is stochastic; and, to the extent that it is affect by weather, random and normally distributed; and, there is not a fixed relationship between units of input and units of output. Although producers can plan for an expected output and, given sufficient experience, estimate how that output might vary, they have no basis for determining how much, or in what direction, output will vary in any one year. Planting decisions of producers are made on the basis of an expected price and an expected set of cost relationships that would permit them, under expected conditions, to earn a return over variable cost sufficient to cover some or all of fixed cost. However, because of the random nature of yield variability, it would be coincidence if expected cost and actual cost or that expected price and actual price coincided. Probability theory is of no assistance for it, according to Boulding, "... is merely the mathematics of the distribution of 'possibilities' ... in situations which can not be empirically identified"(1). Thus, the quantity shock that occurs because of yield and weather variability is a non trivial condition. If no other changes occurred, weather would distort the market by bringing about a mismatch between expected and actual yield and therefore expected and actual prices. As a result, it often takes several production periods to determine the existence of fundamental market changes, that is, shifts in demand or shifts in supply caused by economic forces. This is so because the market determined price allocates the actual supply with demand rather than allocating expected supply.
Floor Prices
Agriculture programs from 1938 to 1985 have by one means or another attempted to establish a floor price for program commodities to address what was perceived to be a low income problem for the sector as a whole. A defense of the floor price was conducted by acquiring stocks and limiting production or marketings. But, a persistent problem remained. That is, it was exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for policymakers to establish a floor price to protect income, which would allow the long run market price to be above the floor by a sufficient amount to clear stocks out of farmer or Government held reserves. This should not be surprising. In order to support income through price supports in a market, demand must be inelastic and prices must be higher than the long run average free market price. The inelasticity of demand has been a major source of problems in setting program parameters because an implicit assumption of the programs has been that variability would be sufficient to empty out the storage. However, this cannot occur unless supply (production) is somehow restricted. Thus, although the legislators and the program managers assumed the problem to be a low income problem, they relied on variability to extract them from the long run excess capacity problem, which they had, in part, created by the supply control effort. For most of the historical period, long run prices appeared to be below the floor price. As a result, stocks accumulated in Government ownership as nonrecourse loans were forfeited.
The focus on price as the trigger variable to initiate a Government action prevented the price from serving as a true signal for production in future periods. That is, current year prices were not a sound basis for forming expectations concerning future prices. Also market allocation of the current year's crop was distorted because the distribution of expected price was truncated on the lower end and the expected price faced by the producer was necessarily higher than the price floor.
D. Gale Johnson has said that "The policies of the 1950's were concerned with attempting to protect agriculture from changing conditions."... "The policies of the 1960's were reasonably effective in aiding agriculture to adjust to the inevitable resource transfers and the relative contraction of the farm sector."(6) The policies of the 1980's, thus far, have again tended to "protect" the sector from changing conditions.
CONDITIONAL POLICY
Stepping back from current programs and considering the prospects for a long term policy for agriculture, it is possible to conceive a framework with both income support and reduction in price variability as objectives. It is also possible to develop programs to support either of these objectives. However, a clear articulation of the policy is required. D. Gale Johnson calls this to our attention quit forcefully. "The most critical assumption is the future level of net income of agriculture. For the years ahead we can not rule out a decline in net agriculture income of 10 percent and a decline of farm operator income of somewhat more. If this were to occur there would probably be some downward pressure on real estate values, unless the income decline were thought to be temporary." He continues: "If my analysis of the flexibility of resource allocation in agriculture is approximately correct, small errors in program formulation will very soon result in substantial cost to taxpayers, and possibly in difficulties in maintaining our preeminent position as a great agricultural exporter. It will, in other words, be relatively easy to create significant excess capacity in agriculture by providing incentives, through prices or payments that are inconsistent with the underlying demand and supply situation. Experience has shown clearly that when agricultural output is greater than the demand at politically acceptable levels of prices, a long time and large income transfers are required to eliminate the excess productive capacity."(6)
Just and Rausser have provided a basis for a new look at commodity policy (7,8). They argue that inflexibility in commodity programs has resulted in policy induced variability [instability] in commodity markets, making decision making by farmers and policymakers even more risky than it would be without commodity programs. They conclude that policy that is conditional in its response to economic conditions will be more likely to result in the transmission of appropriate signals to producers and consumers. Daft concludes that "The principle strength of the chapter by Richard E. Just and Gordon Rausser is its non traditional view of commodity policy. The authors assume that the reduction of risk and uncertainty is the principal justification for commodity policy. After reviewing the recent track record, they find that commodity policy, itself, has often been a source of instability rather than a cure for it. They attribute much of this policy failure to the attempt by legislators to establish future legislation on past economic conditions. When future conditions deviate from the assumed state, as they inevitably do, policy failure has resulted." "...Just and Rausser conclude that legislators should stop trying to anticipate conditions and, instead, adopt policies that would respond automatically to changes in sector economic variables." "As an illustration, they suggest that the Government agree to purchase 1 million bushels of grain for every one cent per bushel that the market price falls below a specified target price."
While Rausser and Just have performed a major service in providing a new perspective on commodity policy, a further extension of their approach will clarify the fundamental farm policy problem.
INSTABILITY, VARIABILITY, RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
According to Offutt and Blanford, "An unambiguous definition of instability would provide the ideal starting point for the selection of an appropriate empirical indicator [of risk]. Unfortunately the concept of instability is nebulous because the perception of what constitutes unstable behavior is largely subjective." "... Variability and instability can not necessarily be equated and require an implicit or explicit judgment be made as to what constitutes 'unacceptable variability'."(11)
For our purposes, it is not necessary that a judgment be made concerning whether or not variability is or is not acceptable. Rather, the issues are: is it measurable, is it reducible and to what extent are variability and uncertainty separable.
For the purpose of this paper it will be convenient to view risk as the measurable variation in a normal random variable, such as yield, with a quantifiable probability distribution of the "possibilities". Uncertainty will be considered as being exemplified by supply or demand shocks to the system that are the result of policy or economic variables where the result is expected to be a systematic change or structural change. Such actions are unmeasurable in an expectations framework and no probabilistic statement can be constructed concerning their occurrence or outcome.
Much of the research related to variability is associated with the stock holding function and the potential for determining an optimal level of stocks with a concept of covering negative supply deviation 80, 90, or 95 times out of 100. In reality, there can be no optimal stock level for any particular year. Because output for the coming season is a random variable, the optimal stock level must also be a random variable. Given an expectation of production variability one can construct an expectation of the level of stocks that would offset the production deviations. One cannot however anticipate, identify and offset supply and demand shifts as a result of policy or production changes.
The Just and Rausser argument, that conditional policy will allow the free market to function while providing stability, presumes that it is possible operate as though it was possible to control price and still allow the market to clear because of quantity variability. The conditional policy response suggested by Just and Rausser reacts to both physical and economic phenomenon and attempts to shield the producer or slow the effect of real supply and demand changes as well as the effects of random yield shocks. They presume that conditional control of the effects of other economic forces on price will reduce the likelihood of policy induced instability. However, Just and Rausser do not consider the possibility and implications of policy induced excess capacity as the result of conditional intervention which prevents the full impact of supply and demand shifts from being realized because of the manipulation of the market price.
Pass Through of Market Signals
While it is possible to mathematically estimate a number for the coefficient of variatation of price, the number is meaningless unless the price variation is random and normally distributed with mean zero. Historical price data contain both random and systematic changes and there is little reason to believe that the deviation will be normally distributed or that the estimate will be unbiased. There is, however, reason to believe that in the absence of market intervention policies the effects of weather would, over time, be normally distributed and it would be possible to remove the weather related effect from prices. It would also be possible to estimate the effects of a stocks management program that reacted to weather variation by acquiring, for example, yield in excess of expected normal and disposing of stocks if yield is less than expected normal.
Under conditions where long term supply and demand were in balance the smoothing effect on quantity would result in a stablity of domestic consumption and a stable supply for export. Such a stocks management policy would minimize the impact of domestic weather variation on commodity prices. All other factors would be reflected in the market including demand and supply shifts as a result of technology or changes in financial or macro policy variables. The effects of weather in importing countries and on competing exporters would also be transmitted through the market. Also the impact of their policies would be felt.
Some have viewed the wide price changes of the 1970's as an indication of increasing variability in the market and concluded that the random forces causing such disturbances may increase in the future. However, many of the events of the seventies appear to have been systematic structural changes which, in connection with random yield disturbances resulted in a confusing set of prices. For example, entry of the Soviet Union into the market on a major scale to aquire grain for livestock feed was a systematic change rather than a random event, as was the decision by the Chinese to buy wheat rather than tighten their belts, and the decision of the U.S. to raise loan rates and target prices rather than let farm income decline in the late seventies. Even the weather shocks on foreign yields are transmitted to our markets through a set of systematic filters that distort the random nature of the yield variability. Thus, the most truly random influence in the market is the effect of domestic weather on domestic yields. All other changes fall into the category of uncertainty or instability. And, it is these changes that are structural or systematic in nature that should be reflected in market price signals.
Implication for Stock Holding
Numerous studies of price variability and variability of quantity marketed, through domestic and export channels, have been conducted. Most have assumed that deviations in price from trend or deviation of production from trend were normally distributed random variables with mean zero (12,14,15). Therefore, the analysts also assumed that the probability of the actual deviating being less than a specified number is also a normally distributed random variable. However, the normal random variable assumption does not appear to be a correct specification of the behavior of either production or price. Many of the forces in the market are systematic and result in deviations that do not have zero mean. This is not to say that a mathematical representation with the sum of the deviations equal to zero cannot be constructed. But that such a construct is an erroneous representation of the forces causing market prices and quantities to change.
Under conditions where long term supply and demand were in balance, the smoothing effect of a reactive policy to acquire positive increments to trend yield and store them until they could be disposed of in periods of low yields would result in stability of supply for the domestic and export markets. Such a stocks management program would minimize the impact of domestic weather variation on commodity prices. All other factors would be reflected in the market including demand and supply shifts as a result of technology or changes in macro or policy variables.
Sharples and Slaughter suggest that "Adding to or releasing from buffer stocks in response to changes in quantity produced would stabilize the major source of food price variance in a closed system. That is, if operated world wide, such a program would provide reasonably stable food supply and prices. Theoretically, a buffer stock managed by such a quantity rule would stabilize prices with minimal interference with the allocation function. Prices would be free to respond to changes in demand [and changes in supply], and the allocation signals so generated would not be clouded by the noises of price changes in response to production variances occasioned by weather vagaries." However, they dismissed the quantity rule because production worldwide is difficult to measure and the size of the quantity buffer stock may preclude the response required. While they suggest that the price rule may be appropriate, they recognize that it runs the danger of obscuring allocation signals generated by non-random supply and demand shifts. "This suggests that the programs have built in self corrective features in order that the reserve acquisition and release prices adjust in accordance with the long un moving equilibrium."
Worldwide rationality on stockholding policy would imply that all producing countries would store the positive deviations from trend yield and dispose of them during periods of negative deviations. Storing more than the positive deviations from trend would require that in some year the market would have less available than had been planned for by producers or expected by consumers. Storing less than the positive deviations means that the probability of incurring a shortfall in stocks is increased because the positive increment from yield has not been stored but consumed and future consumption must be reduced below what it could have been if stocks had been retained.
If the U.S. changes its' policy from encouraging excess production with supported prices to free market pricing, then the appropriate response to changes in export demand would be to allow the market to clear, with the exception that the U.S. would stand ready to buy or sell the additions to or shortfalls from trend yield on whatever acreage was planted. Under such conditions the U.S. would not export its' domestic variability from weather on to the world market.
THE ARGUMENT OF CONTINUING MARKET FAILURE
Heterogeneity in the cost of production and marketing, which is the result of heterogeneity in size, management, technology and location will result in continuing excess capacity disequilibrium and loss of resources from the sector regardless of the form of policy. Because costs vary among firms, any price level within the range of total cost will result in some firms being driven out of the production while others continue to earn returns in excess of their production cost. As a result the assets of the exiting firms will be recombined with those of the more profitable firms and production is likely to expand or cost decline or both, because of the efficiency of the acquiring firm. With no change in demand, price is likely to decline and additional firms will be forced to exit. Continuing consolidation of assets will occur until a homogeneity of sorts is achieved or until an oligopolistic system is developed which permits some control of output that will allow the least competitive firm in the production structure to remain in production because allocation of market shares has occurred.
Policy analysts have identified two basic factors that have been important for agriculture policy determination in the United States. One is a tendency for output to increase faster than consumption. The other is a high degree of variation in commodity output and price variation, which results in variation in earnings. The purpose of this analysis is to explore the causes of excess capacity and price variation and identify how various types of policies and programs might be used to assist in overall adjustment of the farm sector.
The following analysis attempts to separate the various reasons for price and income changes and suggests how particular policy tools may relieve or exacerbate price and income stability and excess capacity problems.
SUPPLY/DEMAND SHIFTS CAUSE CAPACITY AND VARIABILITY PROBLEMS
Prices are the result of the simultaneous interaction of supply and demand. Therefore, before corrective policy actions are taken, it is important to understand whether the changes in price are the result of shifts in supply or demand or some combination of the two. It is also essential to understand whether the shift is a result of short-term or long-term phenomena. Lack of clarity in identifying the source of the change in price or in the reason for a particular price level can lead to a choice of policies that exacerbate rather than correct the perceived problem.
The unique aspects of agriculture are that agricultural production is subject to the random impact of weather and food is basic to survival. There is, thus, a general concern that some groups within the population (either domestic or world population) will have insufficient income to acquire sufficient nutrition for their existence at market determined prices.
Humanitarian Aspects
A humanitarian goal of society is that no one starves regardless of their ability to purchase food. To achieve this goal, output must be greater than the free market would be expected to achieve. This can be achieved by a shift in demand by transferring income to the disadvantaged (for example, through food stamps or other direct income transfers) or by a shift in supply making commodities available to certain segments of society at subsidized prices or through donations. This aspect of agricultural puts it somewhat in the nature of a public utility which must provide service to all segments of society.
Enhancement of the effective demand or expansion of the quantity marketed, is complicated by the biological nature of the production process, the random disturbances in the market created by weather and the inelasticity of demand for the product. These biological factors produce short-run changes in market supply (quantity available for consumption) that make discovery of long run prices extremely difficult and therefore longer term investment and subsidy decisions are frequently made from erroneous price expectation. Improvement of long run price discovery is the primary focus of the remainder of this paper.
BIOLOGICAL NATURE OF THE PRODUCTION PROCESS
Because agriculture is a biological process, it is subject to seasonality, perishability of output, weather related problems and environmental problems including insects, disease, and weeds. Environmental consideration preclude agricultural production in some regions and enhance it in others and alter the feasible output mix in a particular geographic area. To some extent these biological considerations are manageable. That is, we have the ability to modify the environment so that supplies can be obtained at prices that permit adequate returns to the producer for investing in the environmental modification technology. In the following sections, the various biological factors and the implications of allowing the sector to deal with them under free market conditions were considered in a paper presented to SAEA in Feb 1987.
To this point the discussion has focused on the impact of biological factors and weather changes on farm prices and farm income. This section focuses on supply and demand shifts resulting from economic forces.
Demand Shifts
Demand shifts occur because of changes in population, taste and preferences, and income. They may also result from policy decisions made about, and applied to, other sectors of the economy. The demand shifts may be temporary (a few quarters) or they may be permanent. Whatever the cause, a decrease in demand (a shift to the left of the demand schedule) results in consumers buying less of the commodity at any schedule of prices. If no change in the supply occurs, the result of the demand change will be that the price will fall and some smaller quantity will be consumed. In order to achieve an equilibrium some resources must be removed from production. In a free market this occurs because revenue is reduced to the point where it is unprofitable for some producers to produce the commodity and resources are transferred to other employment or underemployed. Setting prices above the new equilibrium level, to maintain producer revenue, results in the accumulation of stocks (inventories). If the demand reduction is permanent or extended, a rigid price floor results in continuous stock accumulation.
Supply Shifts
Changes in supply occur primarily because of changes in technology, changes in the relative price of inputs or changes in the real price of inputs relative to output. For example, adoption of a new technology may result in the ability to produce more grain from the same resources and lower the cost of grain per bushel. Such a change means that at any schedule of prices more grain would be offered for sale. As in the case of a reduction in demand fixing the price above new equilibrium will result in accumulation of stocks.
External Policy Impacts
In addition to the impact of normal economic forces in a free market economy, the farm sector is subject to the impact of Government intervention in other sectors. For example, supply shifts occur as result of tax policy changes that encourage businesses to make investments. In particular, the use of investment credit and accelerated depreciation cause more resources to be employed in the production of crops than would be used without these investment incentives. Tax policy that allows the write off of farm losses against other income provides an incentive to continue farm production even though losses are being incurred. The net effect is to keep more resources employed in production than would be employed without the tax incentive.
Credit policy also encourages the employment of more resources in the sector to the extent that it provides interest subsidies or makes loans available to producers who could not obtain funds through commercial channels.
Monetary and fiscal policy have a substantial impact on the demand for commodities though their impact on business cycles and domestic income and though their effect on foreign exchange rates. Under a restrictive monetary policy which keeps U.S. interest rates above those in other countries the dollar tends to valued higher relative to the currency of potential importers. Thus, prices for U.S. commodities are inflated in the export market and the net effect is the same as if the U.S. supply was shifted left or as if an export tax were imposed on U.S. goods.
Presented with such problems policy makers are often disposed to create exceptions to a policy or to provide for offsetting special conditions. For example, to offset the impact of restrictive monetary policy on farm commodities, export subsidies may be instituted. The result is that the consumer and the taxpayer pay a higher price for the commodity, transfer income to the farmer and subsidize the foreign buyers.
Using farm commodity policy to protect farmers against price and income variability or against "low" incomes is to treat the symptom rather than the problem. Price and income changes occur in response to shifts in supply or demand . The cause of the problem must be uncovered be for a treatment can be proposed. If the source of the problem is outside the sector then perhaps that is the place to develop corrective policy, if such policy is needed. If tax laws are encouraging excess resources in production then a change in the tax law would be in order. If the problem occurs because of forces that are the result of random weather shocks then appropriate tools can be developed to react to but not anticipate weather changes.
ALTERNATIVE FUTURES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY
The need for and the effectiveness of agricultural policy will be determined by the continued certainty of yield variability and by the relative change in output and consumption trends.
If consumption is rising coincident with or faster than output, real prices will tend to remain flat or rise slightly. On the other hand, if output is tending to rise faster than consumption, real prices will tend to fall.
In part, because of past price support policies, more resources are employed in crop production than the level needed to meet domestic and export demand at current prices and stocks are tending to accumulate. To remove the excess capacity from the sector, real prices for output and real earnings must fall to levels which force disinvestment from the sector, resources must be acquired from producers and removed from production, or demand must grow more rapidly than output for an extended period.
Allowing real earnings to fall to the point where a large number of resources are forced out of the sector is a painful solution. Expansion of demand (shifting demand) at a fast enough rate to keep prices from falling appears to be economically impossible. The most feasible solution appears to be some type of resource diversion in combination with stability programs. Achieving the appropriate balance is complicated by the random variation of weather which results in highly variable yields and therefore highly variable prices which gave inappropriate signals for long-term resource commitments. Arbitrarily establishing a rigid price floor or a target price without regard to longer term market forces results in price certainty and has a high probability of providing the wrong type of information about future profitability. Tying price floors to current production costs results in distortion of market signals in a manner that tends to escalate future costs. This results in higher support levels in the future, higher production costs and in a rachet effect on support prices. On the other hand, allowing the market to set output prices without accounting for random disturbances from weather distorts the longer run economic signals that occur from changes in demand or changes in technology and output. These are the economically determined signals that we wish to have the market transmit.
Providing protection against random shocks to the system need not distort long-term market signals if the shocks are not the result of economic forces that is, if they are due entirely to weather. However, if income declines as a result of a change in the business cycle, providing price protection against the shift in demand will result in commitment of more resources in production than would be required. Or, if demand shifts as a result of a change in foreign exchange rates, establishing a price floor could result in a greater reduction in trade than would result from a market determined price.
SUMMARY
The previous discussion suggests that, farm commodity producers are subject to the risk of low levels of income because of the impact of weather and economic forces on the production, marketing consumption and prices of the commodities they produce. Because agricultural production is a biological process which results in the disassociation of the commitment of resources to the production process and the output of those resources, and because rainfall and temperature are not subject to the control of the producer the relationship between committed inputs and output is not fixed. Because the input/output relationship is not fixed and the impact of weather is random in nature, the producers best expectation of the price for the next crop year is likely some average of historical prices. If resources are committed with the expectation of normal yields and prices and the output results in a significantly better or poorer crop, prices and incomes can be dramatically altered, although the producers planned appropriately given their limited information.
Historically, society has recognized this risk and has attempted to protect producer from the most severe aspects of a random loss of income and consumers from the loss of the commodity. In the l930's, programs were established to put a floor under prices and thus prevent farm income from falling during periods of excess production. In order to support prices, nonrecourse loans were made. The loan rate became the price floor and crops not sold were forfeited to the Government.
As income increased, production at the supported price increased and stocks accumulated in Government storage as markets failed to clear and loans were forfeited. To limit stock accumulations, various marketing controls and production controls--largely through acreage diversion and acreage allotment programs--were instituted. In the l970's, with acreage diversion and export subsidy programs in place to help clear stocks, supplies diminished and prices rose rapidly. To prevent rapid price increases in the future, a farmer-owned reserve was introduced. A set of target prices and deficiency payments were established to, in part, guarantee an income transfer to producers who cooperated in supply control and stocks management programs while the loan rate or price floor was to be set near market-clearing levels.
Although there may be differing points of view as to how farm policy should be accomplished, the basis for a future farm policy appears to be linked to the following premises.
l. There is a societal belief and general consensus that farmers should receive some degree of protection from the random force of weather.
2. There is a need to hold some level of stocks against the possibility of a shortage of production but stocks should not be permitted to accumulate to the point where they will not be removed by short crop years.
3. Current year market prices do not allocate resources to the production of commodities in an efficient manner in the short run because of the temporal dislocation of inputs and production and because output is to some extent random. In the long run, resources will tend to be allocated by output prices if long run market signals can be determined.
4. Neither the Government nor the farmer can correctly anticipate or forecast the outcome of a specific crop at planting time except by chance, therefore, programs should be designed to be reactive to crop output rather than anticipate crop output.
5. Because commodity prices have been supported above market clearing levels in the majority of years since the l930s the sector currently employs excess resources in the production of price supported commodities.
6. Market prices will efficiently allocate output among consumers.
7. Protecting farmers from downside income risks requires two forms of programs. One to protect individual producers from the loss of a crop due to random weather events that are localized in nature and another to protect all producers from the price depressing impact of an exceptionally large crop.
8. Consumers desire some form of protection against scarcity from a short crop.
9. Tax payers desire to minimize Government expenditures.
REFERENCES
1. Boulding, Kenneth E., "Normative Science and Public Policy", Economic Analysis and Public Policy, ed. Day, Richard H., Iowa State Press, Ames, Iowa, 1982
2. Brake John R., "Short Term Credit Policies for Dealing With Farm Financial Stress and Their Impacts on Structure and Adoption of New Technologies. Speech ;Cornell, Ithaca, N.Y., 1985
3. Daft, Lynn M., Discussion Alternative Agricultural and Food Policies and the 1985 Farm Bill; Ed. Rausser, Gordon C. and Farrell, Kenneth R.; National Center for Food and Agricultural Policy, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.p 135
4. Harl Neil E., "Proposal for Interim Land Ownership and Financing", Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa Jan."1985
5. Hathaway, Dale E. "Grain Stocks and Economic Stability: A Policy Perspective ;Analysis of Grain Reserves: A Proceedings "ERS, USDA, Washington, DC, August, 1976.
6. Johnson, D. Gale;"Food Production and Marketing: A Review of Economic Developments in Agriculture";Food and Agriculture Policy; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy; Washington D.C., March 10-11, 1977
7. Just, Richard E."Automatic Adjustment Ruless For Agricultural Policy Controls", American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., Nov 1987
8. Just, Richard E. and Rausser, Gordon C.; Uncertain Economic Environments and Conditional Policies; Alternative Agricultural and Food Policies and the 1985 Farm Bill; Ed. Rausser, Gordon C. and Farrell, Kenneth R.; National Center for Food and Agricultural Policy, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C
9. McCalla, Alex F. and Carter, Harold O. "Alternative Agricultural and Food Policy Directions for the U.S. with Emphasis on a Market-Oriented Approach.
10. Miller, Thomas A., "Increasing World Market Fluctuations and U.S. Agriculture: A Summary of Implications", NED, ERS, USDA 1984, ERS Staff Report #AGES 84920
11. Offutt, Susan E. and Blandford, David, "A Review of Empirical Techniques For the Analysis of Commodity Instability" Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell Uni, Ithaca, New York 14853
12. Sharples, Jerry A. and Slaughter, Rudy W.Jr, "Alternative Agriculture and food Policy Directions for the U.S. With Emphasis on Stability of Prices and Producer Income: Alternative Directions for the United States and Implication for Research" Policy workshop Washington DC, Jan 1976, ERS, Farm Foundation and W.A.E.R.C.
13. Spitze, R.G.F. and Martin, Marshall A. Analysis of Food and Agricultural Policies for the Eighties. No. Central Regional Res. Bull. 27l. Ag. Expt. Sta., Univ. of IL, Nov. l980.
14. Walker, Odell L and Nelson, A.Gene, "Agricultural Research and Education Related to Decesion-Making Under Uncertainty: An Interpretive Review of Literature", Agri.Exp.Sta., RR P747 March 1977, Oklahoma State Uni., Stillwater, OK
15. Walker, Rodney L, Sharples, Jerry A. and Holland, Forest, "Grain Reserves For Feed Grain And Wheat in the World Market" Analysis of Grain Reserves A Proceedings, ERS, USDA Washington, DC, Aug 1976
16. Walace, Henry A., "Adjusting Production to Demand Benefits Both Farmers and the Public", Ames, Iowa, Dec. 28, 1922
17. Weber. Mark F. "Views on 1985 Farm Legislation of Agricultural and Consumer Organiziations", Policy Research Notes, Issue 19a, ERS, USDA, Feb 1985
18. Zelner, James A. and Price, J. Michael;"Automatic Adjusters and Farm Commodity Programs: The Case of Stock Triggers"; Speech presented at Southern Agricultural Economics Association Meetings; Biloxi, Mississippi, Jan, 1985
Wednesday, August 30, 2006
The Evolution of Programs
Introduction
Historically agriculture has been subject to periods of surplus and scarcity. During periods of "shortage" and strong demand farmers have responded to strong prices and prospects of high income levels by expanding production. Production increased through advances in productivity and the addition of land, labor and capital. As supply growth outpaced demand growth - prices and farm income declined. Similarly, during bust periods, characterized by low commodity prices and farm income, resources were removed or idled inorder to reduce production and bring demands and supplies into balance.
This is characteristic of U.S. agriculture prior to the 1930s - boom and bust periods. During the Civil War prices and income were high. However, as the war ended supplies grew and prices and income fell. Similarly strong demand and high prices stimulated by World War I provided the necessary incentives to expand production. After WW I and through the 1920s commodity prices and income trended downward.
Agricultural policies are the result of the resolution of conflict. They begin with divergent views about what should be done and end with a compromise between groups. They are carried out through compromises between the apparent or understood intent of laws and regulations and the personal philosophies and interest of policy administrators. Policies are, therefore, ambiguous to some degree. They leave room for interpretation. Policies are often rationalized to some unintended program objective after programs are written into law or regulation. Programs that were undertaken as an implimentation of a policy in dealing with some acute economic, social or political problem acquire a body of data and arguments in their defense that may be quite different from the original justification for the program or policy. Programs whose functions have been fulfilled are often continued for reasons quite different from those intended at the start of the program. Programs thus evolve over time, taking on different purposes and often supporting policies far different from their initial purpose.
Pre World War I
Prior to the First World War policies affecting agriculture were largley development policies focused on developing the fontier and expanding production. This single objective was facilitated by land settlement programs, support of the family farm concept, and increased agricultural productivity. A sound and expanding agriculture would complement industrial growth and economic prosperity. In 1862, a number of acts were passed that "opened the west" and established the importance of agriculture, from a Federal perspective. The Homestead Act granted acreage to those willing to improve the land and live on it for 5 years. The Morrill Land Grant College Act established agriculture as a mainstay at Colleges and Universities. The U.S.D.A. was established in 1862. Also, Congress subsidized development of the transcontinental railway system - to assist in transporting agricultural commodities. Eventually legislation was enacted to support research at agricultural experiment stations (Hatch Act 1887), extend the land grant college concept to black colleges in the South, and to provide Federal funds for agricultural extension (Smith-Lever Act - l914).
Three additional acts that significantly influenced agricultural development in the early 1900s were the Reclamation Act of 1902, the Federal Farm loan Act (1914), and the Capper-Volstead Act (1922). The Reclamation Act provided federal funding for irrigation development which enabled agriculture to expand in the West. The Federal Farm Loan Act established the Farm Credit System which gave farmers access to subsidized credit. The Capper-Volstead Act exempted agricultural cooperatives from the Sherman Antitrust Laws and allowed these organization to increase in number, size and power.
The 1920's -- Program Initiated
To a large extent today's farm commodity programs are a result of the economic chaos that affected agriculture in the 1920's. As the result of a decline in exports, the introduction of mechanical power for hauling freight and people, and the introduction of the tractor for agricutural production the capacity of agriculture to produce far exceeded the demand for its output. As the result of the shift to mechanical power some 50 million acres were released from production of feed for draft animals. At the same time land was being added to the productive base through expansion onto the plains and grass land and through massive irrigation and reclaimation projects. These forces along with the declines in both domestic consumption and exports in the early 1920's resulted in a rapid fall in farm prices while prices of manufactured goods continued to rise.
Farmers sought relief from, what they percived to be, selective economic depression in agriculture through the introduction of bills in Congress to support prices through the purchase of commodities. A more complex approach to price support was to be achieved through the McNary-Haugen Bills which were primarily programs to remove surpluses from domestic markets through export dumping. Although the bills failed to pass in Congress or were vetoed by the President, they brought a focus to the farm policy debate. The quest for "economic justice" for farm people, for "Equality for Agriculture", was lead by George Peak who believed in a natural balance between agriculture and industry and felt that agricultural commodities should be priced such that their puchasing power was maintained on a par with industry.
In 1929, Congress created the Federal Farm Board and povided it with $500,000,000 to purchase commodities in order to support their prices. The funding proved to be inadaquate and the Board with no ability to control production was seen to be a failure. In 1932, the Board recommended legislation which would "provide an effective system for regulating acreage or quantites sold" inorder to raise prices and incomes for producers of commercially traded commodities.
The forerunners of current commodity programs were created in the 1930's to raise the income of producers of "basic" commodities (commodities which were important in commercial markets) by restricting market supply. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) was to be a self supporting program to bring about supply restriction through processor taxes. Revenues were to be use to make allotment payments to producers who set aside up to 20 percent of their acreage. The Secretary of Agriculture proclaimed a 15 percent acreage reduction for contracting farmers to be eligible for payments on the 1934 crop.
In the Case of the U.S. vs. Butler, often referred to as the Hoosic Mills decision, the Supreme Court on January 6, 1936 declared the processor tax and production control provisions of the AAA unconstitutional. Thus, the self-financing provisions were eliminated and supply control was disrupted for a short period. To responed to the short-term crisis and replace the production control provisions of the AAA, Congress rushed through the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 by February 29, 1936, less than 2 months after the Hoosic Mills Decision. Under the 1936 Act, acreage reduction was to be achieved through conservation programs, however, the program failed to restrict output.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 brought about stronger Federal intervention in the market. The term parity was introduced into legislation for the first time and the Secretary was required to make nonrecourse loans for producers of corn, wheat and cotton. Nonrecourse loans were at the option of the Secretary for rice and tobbacco. Loans were set at a fixed percentage of parity. In addition, producers were to receive parity payments to bring their return as close to parity as possible with available funds. Because program benefits, from higher prices and parity payments, were tied to production, the larger and the more efficient a producer the larger the benefits to that producer.
The Commodity Credit Corporation was established by executive order in 1933, which provided loans to cotton producers enabling growers to hold their cotton until prices improved. For fruits and vegetables, production controls were supplemented by marketing agreements. Quotas were implemented for sugar.
1940s - Abortive Attempts of Price Support Flexibility
Despite the use of acreage allotments and marketing quotas, commodity inventories began to increase in the late 1930s, particularly those owned and controlled by the government. Yield growth helped to make production controls ineffective. By 1939, direct government payments accounted for 35 percent of net cash income and 30 percent in 1940. However, WW II stimulus improved export demand and as a result prices strengthened and direct government payments fell to 13 percent of net cash income in 1941. WW II postponed the need to address growing surpluses and government costs in the 1940s.
Government price supports which were set between 52 and 75 percent of parity in 1938 were above market cleaning levels as surpluses started to become burdensome. However, the improvement in the industrial sector provided Congress with the impetus to raise support for agricultural commodities up to 85 percent of parity (for those commodities which producers had not disproved marketing quotas). Later legislation over 1941 and 1942 period raised support to 90 percent for some commodities and extended the level of support at these high levels to 1948. By 1945 more than l00 commodities were supported at high (above market clearing) levels. During the war years supports rose and supply control requirements declined.
As the war ended debate arose as to what direction supports should take - high fixed supports as in the War years or flexible more market oriented dependant on existing supplies. The Agricultural Act of 1948 favored flexible supports over time. However, supports would remain at near the 1948 levels for 1949 plantings. The 1948 act also revised the parity price formula specifying farm - nonfarm relationships dependant on current (10 years) period to account for productivity and then faster changes since the early 1900s. This would also support levels to decline beginning in 1950. The surplus problem facing policy makers in the late 40s was contributed to by the adoption of hybrid seed for corn and the full transition to "tractor power" as opposed to horse power.
Because prices were expected to collapse following the close of the war the Steagall Amendment was enacted in 1941 to keep prices at war time levels for two years. The amendment expired December 31, 1948. Although there was a growing bipartisan and multi-commodity group consensus that flexible price supports were desirable, the Agricultural Act of 1948 extended high price supports for one more year, after which flexible price supports based on a percentage of parity were to become effective. However, surpluses accumulated and in an act of expediency the Agricultural Act of 1949 pegged price supports at 90 percent of parity through 1950.
After 1951 cooperating producers of basic commodities could receive support levels between 75 an 90 percent of parity (if marketing quotas were not disapproved). Additional refinements to the parity pricing formula were made on the 1949 Act which general merged the price index level.
The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 lead to a continuation of high price supports through 1952 for national security purposes and neither acreage allotments or marketing quotas were in effect for the 1950 or 1951 crops of wheat, rice, corn or cotton and stocks held by the CCC accumulated rapidly.
The 1950's -- Recognition of and Dealing with Excess Capacity
Flexibility in price supports was again deferred by Congress in July 1952 though by passing legislation to provide for 90 percent of parity for the 1953 and 1954 crops, if producers had not disapproved of marketing quotas.
Acreage allotments were reinstated for corn for the first time since WW II and marketing quotas were proclaimed for wheat and cotton and continued for tobacco and peanuts. Yet, 90 percent of parity loan rates resulted in the rapid accumulation of stocks by the CCC. The application of acreage allotments to a crop like corn caused expansion of production of nonallotment crops and depressed prices. It was becoming apparent that the rigidity of allotments did not allow for efficient production adjustment.
In recognition that rigid and high loan rates were incompatible with real economic conditions, the Eisenhower Administration moved to implement the adoption of flexible price supports. The Agricultural Act of 1954 set price supports at 82.5 to 90 percent of parity in 1955 and 75 to 90 percent of parity thereafter. A portion of CCC stock holdings were to be set aside and disposed of by export, donation and disaster relief.
The export market was first considered by Congress in the passage of Public Law 480 in 1954. This Act proved to be of major importance in assisting in the disposal of stocks yet it was limited in scope to sales for soft currencys, emergency relief and bartering for strategic material.
Although support prices were made flexible, the range of flexibility was not sufficient to slow the growth in output to an equilibrium situation with demand growth. Pressure from increasing stocks resulted in the establishment of the Soil Bank by the Agricultural Act of 1956. Because prices were above world levels, direct sales in world markets were not occurring and output restrictions seemed imperative. The Soil Bank was designed to take cropland out of production. Composed of an Acreage Reserve and a Conservation Reserve, the soil bank attempted to deal with both short-term and long-term problems.
The Acreage Reserve was an annual program that replaced the acreage allotment. Under the program farmers could reduce the acreage devoted to a crop below their allotment and be paid for diverting it to conserving uses. In 1957 the program had 21.4 million acres out of production, but it was terminated after 1958 because it was condemned as a high cost program that was ineffective in controlling production.
The Conservation Reserve was viewed as a measure to deal with the longer term adjustment of resources out of agriculture. Contracts were signed for a maximum of ten years for whole farms and for cropland to be diverted to conservation uses. By 1960, 28.6 million acres were under the program. The last land left the reserve in 1972. The 1956 Act also began a two tiered pricing system for rice with export rice supported at a different level that domestic rice.
The 1960's -- Direct Payments and Acreage Reduction
By 1960, the high price supports of 1953 had given way to generally lower and more flexible prices however neither the lowering of prices nor the restrictions on acreage had been able to bring about an equilibrium between output growth and demand growth. The export market while increasing slowly, through PL-480, was not moving grain at prices as high as our domestic support levels. Stocks reached record levels.
The decade year of the 1960 saw a fundamental shift in programs from price support to direct income support payments and from voluntary acreage reduction to diversion programs.
Beginning in 1961 Congress passed a bill giving the Secretary of Agriculture authority to make payments to producers in cash or certificates to achieve acreage reduction of at least 20 percent for corn and grain sorghum. Payments were made on 50 percent of their normal yield. If they withheld an additional 20 percent they were paid on 60 percent of normal yield.
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1962 continued the voluntary acreage reduction program but broke new ground by separating price support and income support payments. Loan rates on corn were allowed to decline to near the world price level. A direct income supplement of $.18 a bushel of normal yield was made to support farmer incomes if farmers complied with acreage reduction programs. The combination of large acreage reduction programs and world level loan rates resulted in a significant decline in grain stocks during the 1960 and by 1970 CCC stocks were approaching zero. However, the cost of direct income support payments rose rapidly and reached $3.8 billion in 1969.
The 1970's -- Foreign Market Dependency
Throughout the 1970's production capacity and export growth were issues. Farm programs increasingly built in inflation adjustments.
In the early 1970's a combination of acreage reduction and export subsidy programs, a series of devaluations of the U.S. dollar, and short crops in the USSR and India emptied the U.S. bins. Because of the Russian grain sale in 1972, grain prices rose rapidly. The Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 expanded the concept of market orientation and introduced target prices and deficiency payments to replace the price support payments of the previous 10 years. Deficiency payments were to be made only when prices fell below the target price.
The short run situation of strong export demand and low stocks gave rise to a concern about the long run availability and stability of the market. General inflation in the economy and rising prices for fuel and fertilizer created increasing concern over costs of production. The initial target was fixed abitrarily by legislation and had no relationship to market conditions. In later years they were to adjusted by an index of the cost of production.
Yet, there was an effort to maintain the market orientation of the programs by keeping loan rates low relative to market prices. For cotton, loan rates were set at 90 percent of the price of U.S. cotton in world markets. Corn loans were well below the market. As the export market remained strong, more and more people came to believe that the future would be a period with more years of scarcity than of surplus. On the strength of tight markets lenders provided money to farmers to by land and machinery at higher and higher prices.
The Food and Agricultural Act of 1977 was an accommodation to the general inflationary spiral raising loan rates and target prices well above previous levels and above the recommendations of the Administration. Target prices changes were tied to changes in cost of production. A Farmer Owned Grain Reserve (FOR) was created to provide for the possibility of extended nonrecourse loans to farmers in order to provide for a buffer stock to encourage farmers to manage stocks. To encourage participation in the FOR farmers were offered an advance storage payment. Stocks were to remain in the reserve until market prices exceeded release prices.
Although exports remained strong in the late seventies grain was rapidly accumulating in the FOR. Market prices fluctuated with several shocks to the export market and program management became a complex game of balancing the entry and exit of stocks from the FOR.
The 1980's -- Changing Direction; Liberalization
The 1980's brought about the full realization that farm programs cannot be developed in isolation of macroeconomics and international competitiveness. Domestic policies have been clearly seen to have international market implications that alter the actions of consuming and and competitor nations. The beginning of the 1980's saw a reversal of world market conditions.
The value of the dollar rose sharply. Production increased in the consuming nations and our competitors were under-pricing the the U.S. in the world market.
In order to keep grain off the market and out of the CCC the loan rate on FOR grain was increased above the rate for regular CCC loans. Market prices declined and in 1981 dropped below the FOR loan rate for corn and approached the FOR rate for wheat.
Initial efforts toward a 1981 Farm Bill recognized the need for greater market orientation and a reduction in budget costs. However, with the export market turning sour, farmers were applying pressure for greater income protection. The farm sectors performance in 1981 was worse than expected and prices were well below 1980 levels. The grain provisions of the 1981 Act were a Congressional experiment in legislated prices base on expected rapid inflation in production cost.
World wide recession, a continuing strong dollar, and large increases in output dashed hope that the market would recover in 1982. Season average prices for corn and wheat were below the loan rate. Deficiency payments rose sharply. Rigid price floors were again creating stock piles as U.S. commodities were priced out of the market.
PIK, the largest acreage reduction program in the history of farm programs, was introduced in 1983. A total of 82 million acres wase enrolled under the PIK program with payment at 80 percent of production for all crops but wheat and at 90 percent of production for wheat. A combination of PIK and drought in 1983 cut stocks sharply and prices rose much more than anticipated. The bins were refilled in 1984.
The Food Security Act of 1985 introduced a general realization that world markets are a controlling factor in U.S. agriculture. Price supports were reduced from levels projected in the 1981 Bill and farmer incomes have been upheld by direct government payments. Export enhancement programs along with the declining value of the dollar and a modest recovery in world market have resulted in a turn around in exports. Acreage reduction programs and payments in CERTs have reduced stocks. Marketing loans for rice and cotton have made us competitive at world prices.
The evolution of programs has been conditioned by short-term economic and political conditions. Emergency measures once enacted have evolved into long-term programs that often had different objectives and impacts than those intended in the original legislation. Throughout most of the history of the programs the importance of market pricing has been stressed on a bipartisan basis. Yet, political expediency has resulted in a 55 year history of price support programs. A full recognition that income support through ridged prices is unfeasible over the long term is required in order to move to a market oriened program.
Multilateral efforts to bring about rationality in world markets by removing domestic and export market programs that interfere with prices and distort trade are essential to remove the excess capacity problem.
Historically agriculture has been subject to periods of surplus and scarcity. During periods of "shortage" and strong demand farmers have responded to strong prices and prospects of high income levels by expanding production. Production increased through advances in productivity and the addition of land, labor and capital. As supply growth outpaced demand growth - prices and farm income declined. Similarly, during bust periods, characterized by low commodity prices and farm income, resources were removed or idled inorder to reduce production and bring demands and supplies into balance.
This is characteristic of U.S. agriculture prior to the 1930s - boom and bust periods. During the Civil War prices and income were high. However, as the war ended supplies grew and prices and income fell. Similarly strong demand and high prices stimulated by World War I provided the necessary incentives to expand production. After WW I and through the 1920s commodity prices and income trended downward.
Agricultural policies are the result of the resolution of conflict. They begin with divergent views about what should be done and end with a compromise between groups. They are carried out through compromises between the apparent or understood intent of laws and regulations and the personal philosophies and interest of policy administrators. Policies are, therefore, ambiguous to some degree. They leave room for interpretation. Policies are often rationalized to some unintended program objective after programs are written into law or regulation. Programs that were undertaken as an implimentation of a policy in dealing with some acute economic, social or political problem acquire a body of data and arguments in their defense that may be quite different from the original justification for the program or policy. Programs whose functions have been fulfilled are often continued for reasons quite different from those intended at the start of the program. Programs thus evolve over time, taking on different purposes and often supporting policies far different from their initial purpose.
Pre World War I
Prior to the First World War policies affecting agriculture were largley development policies focused on developing the fontier and expanding production. This single objective was facilitated by land settlement programs, support of the family farm concept, and increased agricultural productivity. A sound and expanding agriculture would complement industrial growth and economic prosperity. In 1862, a number of acts were passed that "opened the west" and established the importance of agriculture, from a Federal perspective. The Homestead Act granted acreage to those willing to improve the land and live on it for 5 years. The Morrill Land Grant College Act established agriculture as a mainstay at Colleges and Universities. The U.S.D.A. was established in 1862. Also, Congress subsidized development of the transcontinental railway system - to assist in transporting agricultural commodities. Eventually legislation was enacted to support research at agricultural experiment stations (Hatch Act 1887), extend the land grant college concept to black colleges in the South, and to provide Federal funds for agricultural extension (Smith-Lever Act - l914).
Three additional acts that significantly influenced agricultural development in the early 1900s were the Reclamation Act of 1902, the Federal Farm loan Act (1914), and the Capper-Volstead Act (1922). The Reclamation Act provided federal funding for irrigation development which enabled agriculture to expand in the West. The Federal Farm Loan Act established the Farm Credit System which gave farmers access to subsidized credit. The Capper-Volstead Act exempted agricultural cooperatives from the Sherman Antitrust Laws and allowed these organization to increase in number, size and power.
The 1920's -- Program Initiated
To a large extent today's farm commodity programs are a result of the economic chaos that affected agriculture in the 1920's. As the result of a decline in exports, the introduction of mechanical power for hauling freight and people, and the introduction of the tractor for agricutural production the capacity of agriculture to produce far exceeded the demand for its output. As the result of the shift to mechanical power some 50 million acres were released from production of feed for draft animals. At the same time land was being added to the productive base through expansion onto the plains and grass land and through massive irrigation and reclaimation projects. These forces along with the declines in both domestic consumption and exports in the early 1920's resulted in a rapid fall in farm prices while prices of manufactured goods continued to rise.
Farmers sought relief from, what they percived to be, selective economic depression in agriculture through the introduction of bills in Congress to support prices through the purchase of commodities. A more complex approach to price support was to be achieved through the McNary-Haugen Bills which were primarily programs to remove surpluses from domestic markets through export dumping. Although the bills failed to pass in Congress or were vetoed by the President, they brought a focus to the farm policy debate. The quest for "economic justice" for farm people, for "Equality for Agriculture", was lead by George Peak who believed in a natural balance between agriculture and industry and felt that agricultural commodities should be priced such that their puchasing power was maintained on a par with industry.
In 1929, Congress created the Federal Farm Board and povided it with $500,000,000 to purchase commodities in order to support their prices. The funding proved to be inadaquate and the Board with no ability to control production was seen to be a failure. In 1932, the Board recommended legislation which would "provide an effective system for regulating acreage or quantites sold" inorder to raise prices and incomes for producers of commercially traded commodities.
The forerunners of current commodity programs were created in the 1930's to raise the income of producers of "basic" commodities (commodities which were important in commercial markets) by restricting market supply. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) was to be a self supporting program to bring about supply restriction through processor taxes. Revenues were to be use to make allotment payments to producers who set aside up to 20 percent of their acreage. The Secretary of Agriculture proclaimed a 15 percent acreage reduction for contracting farmers to be eligible for payments on the 1934 crop.
In the Case of the U.S. vs. Butler, often referred to as the Hoosic Mills decision, the Supreme Court on January 6, 1936 declared the processor tax and production control provisions of the AAA unconstitutional. Thus, the self-financing provisions were eliminated and supply control was disrupted for a short period. To responed to the short-term crisis and replace the production control provisions of the AAA, Congress rushed through the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 by February 29, 1936, less than 2 months after the Hoosic Mills Decision. Under the 1936 Act, acreage reduction was to be achieved through conservation programs, however, the program failed to restrict output.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 brought about stronger Federal intervention in the market. The term parity was introduced into legislation for the first time and the Secretary was required to make nonrecourse loans for producers of corn, wheat and cotton. Nonrecourse loans were at the option of the Secretary for rice and tobbacco. Loans were set at a fixed percentage of parity. In addition, producers were to receive parity payments to bring their return as close to parity as possible with available funds. Because program benefits, from higher prices and parity payments, were tied to production, the larger and the more efficient a producer the larger the benefits to that producer.
The Commodity Credit Corporation was established by executive order in 1933, which provided loans to cotton producers enabling growers to hold their cotton until prices improved. For fruits and vegetables, production controls were supplemented by marketing agreements. Quotas were implemented for sugar.
1940s - Abortive Attempts of Price Support Flexibility
Despite the use of acreage allotments and marketing quotas, commodity inventories began to increase in the late 1930s, particularly those owned and controlled by the government. Yield growth helped to make production controls ineffective. By 1939, direct government payments accounted for 35 percent of net cash income and 30 percent in 1940. However, WW II stimulus improved export demand and as a result prices strengthened and direct government payments fell to 13 percent of net cash income in 1941. WW II postponed the need to address growing surpluses and government costs in the 1940s.
Government price supports which were set between 52 and 75 percent of parity in 1938 were above market cleaning levels as surpluses started to become burdensome. However, the improvement in the industrial sector provided Congress with the impetus to raise support for agricultural commodities up to 85 percent of parity (for those commodities which producers had not disproved marketing quotas). Later legislation over 1941 and 1942 period raised support to 90 percent for some commodities and extended the level of support at these high levels to 1948. By 1945 more than l00 commodities were supported at high (above market clearing) levels. During the war years supports rose and supply control requirements declined.
As the war ended debate arose as to what direction supports should take - high fixed supports as in the War years or flexible more market oriented dependant on existing supplies. The Agricultural Act of 1948 favored flexible supports over time. However, supports would remain at near the 1948 levels for 1949 plantings. The 1948 act also revised the parity price formula specifying farm - nonfarm relationships dependant on current (10 years) period to account for productivity and then faster changes since the early 1900s. This would also support levels to decline beginning in 1950. The surplus problem facing policy makers in the late 40s was contributed to by the adoption of hybrid seed for corn and the full transition to "tractor power" as opposed to horse power.
Because prices were expected to collapse following the close of the war the Steagall Amendment was enacted in 1941 to keep prices at war time levels for two years. The amendment expired December 31, 1948. Although there was a growing bipartisan and multi-commodity group consensus that flexible price supports were desirable, the Agricultural Act of 1948 extended high price supports for one more year, after which flexible price supports based on a percentage of parity were to become effective. However, surpluses accumulated and in an act of expediency the Agricultural Act of 1949 pegged price supports at 90 percent of parity through 1950.
After 1951 cooperating producers of basic commodities could receive support levels between 75 an 90 percent of parity (if marketing quotas were not disapproved). Additional refinements to the parity pricing formula were made on the 1949 Act which general merged the price index level.
The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 lead to a continuation of high price supports through 1952 for national security purposes and neither acreage allotments or marketing quotas were in effect for the 1950 or 1951 crops of wheat, rice, corn or cotton and stocks held by the CCC accumulated rapidly.
The 1950's -- Recognition of and Dealing with Excess Capacity
Flexibility in price supports was again deferred by Congress in July 1952 though by passing legislation to provide for 90 percent of parity for the 1953 and 1954 crops, if producers had not disapproved of marketing quotas.
Acreage allotments were reinstated for corn for the first time since WW II and marketing quotas were proclaimed for wheat and cotton and continued for tobacco and peanuts. Yet, 90 percent of parity loan rates resulted in the rapid accumulation of stocks by the CCC. The application of acreage allotments to a crop like corn caused expansion of production of nonallotment crops and depressed prices. It was becoming apparent that the rigidity of allotments did not allow for efficient production adjustment.
In recognition that rigid and high loan rates were incompatible with real economic conditions, the Eisenhower Administration moved to implement the adoption of flexible price supports. The Agricultural Act of 1954 set price supports at 82.5 to 90 percent of parity in 1955 and 75 to 90 percent of parity thereafter. A portion of CCC stock holdings were to be set aside and disposed of by export, donation and disaster relief.
The export market was first considered by Congress in the passage of Public Law 480 in 1954. This Act proved to be of major importance in assisting in the disposal of stocks yet it was limited in scope to sales for soft currencys, emergency relief and bartering for strategic material.
Although support prices were made flexible, the range of flexibility was not sufficient to slow the growth in output to an equilibrium situation with demand growth. Pressure from increasing stocks resulted in the establishment of the Soil Bank by the Agricultural Act of 1956. Because prices were above world levels, direct sales in world markets were not occurring and output restrictions seemed imperative. The Soil Bank was designed to take cropland out of production. Composed of an Acreage Reserve and a Conservation Reserve, the soil bank attempted to deal with both short-term and long-term problems.
The Acreage Reserve was an annual program that replaced the acreage allotment. Under the program farmers could reduce the acreage devoted to a crop below their allotment and be paid for diverting it to conserving uses. In 1957 the program had 21.4 million acres out of production, but it was terminated after 1958 because it was condemned as a high cost program that was ineffective in controlling production.
The Conservation Reserve was viewed as a measure to deal with the longer term adjustment of resources out of agriculture. Contracts were signed for a maximum of ten years for whole farms and for cropland to be diverted to conservation uses. By 1960, 28.6 million acres were under the program. The last land left the reserve in 1972. The 1956 Act also began a two tiered pricing system for rice with export rice supported at a different level that domestic rice.
The 1960's -- Direct Payments and Acreage Reduction
By 1960, the high price supports of 1953 had given way to generally lower and more flexible prices however neither the lowering of prices nor the restrictions on acreage had been able to bring about an equilibrium between output growth and demand growth. The export market while increasing slowly, through PL-480, was not moving grain at prices as high as our domestic support levels. Stocks reached record levels.
The decade year of the 1960 saw a fundamental shift in programs from price support to direct income support payments and from voluntary acreage reduction to diversion programs.
Beginning in 1961 Congress passed a bill giving the Secretary of Agriculture authority to make payments to producers in cash or certificates to achieve acreage reduction of at least 20 percent for corn and grain sorghum. Payments were made on 50 percent of their normal yield. If they withheld an additional 20 percent they were paid on 60 percent of normal yield.
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1962 continued the voluntary acreage reduction program but broke new ground by separating price support and income support payments. Loan rates on corn were allowed to decline to near the world price level. A direct income supplement of $.18 a bushel of normal yield was made to support farmer incomes if farmers complied with acreage reduction programs. The combination of large acreage reduction programs and world level loan rates resulted in a significant decline in grain stocks during the 1960 and by 1970 CCC stocks were approaching zero. However, the cost of direct income support payments rose rapidly and reached $3.8 billion in 1969.
The 1970's -- Foreign Market Dependency
Throughout the 1970's production capacity and export growth were issues. Farm programs increasingly built in inflation adjustments.
In the early 1970's a combination of acreage reduction and export subsidy programs, a series of devaluations of the U.S. dollar, and short crops in the USSR and India emptied the U.S. bins. Because of the Russian grain sale in 1972, grain prices rose rapidly. The Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 expanded the concept of market orientation and introduced target prices and deficiency payments to replace the price support payments of the previous 10 years. Deficiency payments were to be made only when prices fell below the target price.
The short run situation of strong export demand and low stocks gave rise to a concern about the long run availability and stability of the market. General inflation in the economy and rising prices for fuel and fertilizer created increasing concern over costs of production. The initial target was fixed abitrarily by legislation and had no relationship to market conditions. In later years they were to adjusted by an index of the cost of production.
Yet, there was an effort to maintain the market orientation of the programs by keeping loan rates low relative to market prices. For cotton, loan rates were set at 90 percent of the price of U.S. cotton in world markets. Corn loans were well below the market. As the export market remained strong, more and more people came to believe that the future would be a period with more years of scarcity than of surplus. On the strength of tight markets lenders provided money to farmers to by land and machinery at higher and higher prices.
The Food and Agricultural Act of 1977 was an accommodation to the general inflationary spiral raising loan rates and target prices well above previous levels and above the recommendations of the Administration. Target prices changes were tied to changes in cost of production. A Farmer Owned Grain Reserve (FOR) was created to provide for the possibility of extended nonrecourse loans to farmers in order to provide for a buffer stock to encourage farmers to manage stocks. To encourage participation in the FOR farmers were offered an advance storage payment. Stocks were to remain in the reserve until market prices exceeded release prices.
Although exports remained strong in the late seventies grain was rapidly accumulating in the FOR. Market prices fluctuated with several shocks to the export market and program management became a complex game of balancing the entry and exit of stocks from the FOR.
The 1980's -- Changing Direction; Liberalization
The 1980's brought about the full realization that farm programs cannot be developed in isolation of macroeconomics and international competitiveness. Domestic policies have been clearly seen to have international market implications that alter the actions of consuming and and competitor nations. The beginning of the 1980's saw a reversal of world market conditions.
The value of the dollar rose sharply. Production increased in the consuming nations and our competitors were under-pricing the the U.S. in the world market.
In order to keep grain off the market and out of the CCC the loan rate on FOR grain was increased above the rate for regular CCC loans. Market prices declined and in 1981 dropped below the FOR loan rate for corn and approached the FOR rate for wheat.
Initial efforts toward a 1981 Farm Bill recognized the need for greater market orientation and a reduction in budget costs. However, with the export market turning sour, farmers were applying pressure for greater income protection. The farm sectors performance in 1981 was worse than expected and prices were well below 1980 levels. The grain provisions of the 1981 Act were a Congressional experiment in legislated prices base on expected rapid inflation in production cost.
World wide recession, a continuing strong dollar, and large increases in output dashed hope that the market would recover in 1982. Season average prices for corn and wheat were below the loan rate. Deficiency payments rose sharply. Rigid price floors were again creating stock piles as U.S. commodities were priced out of the market.
PIK, the largest acreage reduction program in the history of farm programs, was introduced in 1983. A total of 82 million acres wase enrolled under the PIK program with payment at 80 percent of production for all crops but wheat and at 90 percent of production for wheat. A combination of PIK and drought in 1983 cut stocks sharply and prices rose much more than anticipated. The bins were refilled in 1984.
The Food Security Act of 1985 introduced a general realization that world markets are a controlling factor in U.S. agriculture. Price supports were reduced from levels projected in the 1981 Bill and farmer incomes have been upheld by direct government payments. Export enhancement programs along with the declining value of the dollar and a modest recovery in world market have resulted in a turn around in exports. Acreage reduction programs and payments in CERTs have reduced stocks. Marketing loans for rice and cotton have made us competitive at world prices.
The evolution of programs has been conditioned by short-term economic and political conditions. Emergency measures once enacted have evolved into long-term programs that often had different objectives and impacts than those intended in the original legislation. Throughout most of the history of the programs the importance of market pricing has been stressed on a bipartisan basis. Yet, political expediency has resulted in a 55 year history of price support programs. A full recognition that income support through ridged prices is unfeasible over the long term is required in order to move to a market oriened program.
Multilateral efforts to bring about rationality in world markets by removing domestic and export market programs that interfere with prices and distort trade are essential to remove the excess capacity problem.
Why do we have farm programs
Farm problems are on the U.S. policy agenda largely because dissatisfied farmers, working through their special interest groups and their congressmen, put them there. For the most part, Farm Bills are written by the special interest groups that are affected by the Bill. The policies that arise out of Farm Bill debates reflect the compromises that result from Congressional efforts to deal with peoples' conflicting views about what ought to be. They reflect the beliefs and values of farmers and others concerning equity and efficiency in the farm sector and the economy as a whole.
People disagree about beliefs and values and about the effects of programs. Some contend that farmers are in a chronically disadvantaged disequilibrium situation and they believe that this situation is not self-correcting and is not of the farmers' own making. They believe that the sector deserves compensating intervention through government programs. Others believe that agricultural commodity markets operate competitively so that all resources would be exactly and fairly compensated for their contribution to output if the government would withdraw from farm programs and the free markets were allowed to bring about equilibrium adjustments.
Since 1933, the primary thrust of U.S. farm policy has been to transfer income from the non-farm sector to what farmers and many policy makers believed was a "relatively disadvantaged" farm sector. Programs that were intended to be temporary when introduced in the 1930s have persisted. And, they have evolved over time to address problems which grew out of their own unintended consequences. Many, though not all, consider past programs to be increasingly inappropriate as U.S. agriculture continues to change.
Differences in emphasis can be detected from one year to another in the national debates on farm policy, but over the decades there has been a consistency in the problems that Congress attemps to deal with; including price and income prospects, the distribution of income, the role of technology, the availability of resources, expansion of domestic and foreign markets, risk management, financial stress, and others.
Brandow's review of the literature on "Policy for Commercial Agriculture, 1945-71" makes it clear that the issues faced by Congress today are not new. Ted Schultz, D. Gale Johnson, Brandow, and a multitude of economist's following
People disagree about beliefs and values and about the effects of programs. Some contend that farmers are in a chronically disadvantaged disequilibrium situation and they believe that this situation is not self-correcting and is not of the farmers' own making. They believe that the sector deserves compensating intervention through government programs. Others believe that agricultural commodity markets operate competitively so that all resources would be exactly and fairly compensated for their contribution to output if the government would withdraw from farm programs and the free markets were allowed to bring about equilibrium adjustments.
Since 1933, the primary thrust of U.S. farm policy has been to transfer income from the non-farm sector to what farmers and many policy makers believed was a "relatively disadvantaged" farm sector. Programs that were intended to be temporary when introduced in the 1930s have persisted. And, they have evolved over time to address problems which grew out of their own unintended consequences. Many, though not all, consider past programs to be increasingly inappropriate as U.S. agriculture continues to change.
Differences in emphasis can be detected from one year to another in the national debates on farm policy, but over the decades there has been a consistency in the problems that Congress attemps to deal with; including price and income prospects, the distribution of income, the role of technology, the availability of resources, expansion of domestic and foreign markets, risk management, financial stress, and others.
Brandow's review of the literature on "Policy for Commercial Agriculture, 1945-71" makes it clear that the issues faced by Congress today are not new. Ted Schultz, D. Gale Johnson, Brandow, and a multitude of economist's following
Roosevelt's Agriculture Adjustment Goals
Exerpts from "Wheat and the AAA" pages 33-35.
Franklin Roosevelt in a campaign speech at Topeka, Kansas in September 1932 enunciated the following six points for a program for agricultural adjustment.
In December of 1932, the Federal Farm Board, in its report to Congress, went on record supporting certain principles of a farm program.
Franklin Roosevelt in a campaign speech at Topeka, Kansas in September 1932 enunciated the following six points for a program for agricultural adjustment.
"1. The plan must provide for the producer of staple commodities, such as wheat, cotton, corn (in the form of hogs), and tobacco, a tariff benefit over world prices which is equivalent to the benefit given by the tariff to industrial products. this differential benefit must be so applied that the increase in farm income, purchasing and debt-paying power will not stimulate further production.
2. The plan must finance itself. Agriculture at no time sought and does not now seek such access to the public treasury as was provided by the futile and costly attempts at price stabilization by the Federal Farm Board. It seeks only equality of opportunity with tariff protected industry.
3. It must not make use of any mechanism which would cause our European customers to retaliate on the grounds of dumping. It must be based upon making the tariff effective and direct in its operation.
4. It must make use of existing agencies and so far as possible be decentralized in its administration so that the chief responsibility for its operation will rest with the locality rather than with newly created bureaucratic machinery in Washington.
5. It must operate as nearly as possible on a co-operative basis and its effect must be to enhance and strengthen the co-operative movement. It should moreover, be constituted so that it can be withdrawn whenever the emergency has passed, and normal foreign markets have been re-established.
6. The plan must be, in so far as possible, voluntary. I like the idea that the plan should not be put into operation unless it has the support of a reasonable proportion of the producers of the exportable commodity, on which it is to apply. It must be so organized that the benefits will go to the man who participates."
In December of 1932, the Federal Farm Board, in its report to Congress, went on record supporting certain principles of a farm program.
"One of the present needs is not to stabilize the variations in farm prices but to raise their general level up to the average level of other commodities. In light of experience ... the Board recommends that any new legislation be based on the following principles,...
(1) Prices cannot be raised unless some one pays the cost. The new plan must be self-sustaining, with a continuous method of covering the cost.
(2) Prices cannot be kept at fair levels unless production is adjusted to meet market demands. ... Any method which provided higher prices and did not include effective regulation of acreage or quantities sold, or both would tend to increase the present surpluses and soon break down as a result."
Tuesday, August 22, 2006
Thursday, August 10, 2006
Cape Cod
On the 11th we leave for Cape Cod for a family vacation. I’m happy that all 10 of use will be able to get together this year. We have a house that is big enough for all of us and an adopted brother, uncle, friend, priest.
While we are on the cape everyone will be able to do their own thing, but most nights we’ll be together for dinner. There is a rumor that some people would like grandma and grandpa to babysit while they enjoy a night out. I’m sure that can be arranged.
The car is packed and ready to go in the morning. The last thing to go in is the ice chest and a bag for the hotel tomorrow night.
While we are on the cape everyone will be able to do their own thing, but most nights we’ll be together for dinner. There is a rumor that some people would like grandma and grandpa to babysit while they enjoy a night out. I’m sure that can be arranged.
The car is packed and ready to go in the morning. The last thing to go in is the ice chest and a bag for the hotel tomorrow night.
Monday, August 07, 2006
Back to being young
August
Here it is again, August, a month of hot sultry days that are the real part of summer. A lot of the farm work is done for a while. The hay has been made, the wheat has been cut and threshed and the oats may still be standing in the shock or by now it has been threshed. It is time to go to camp.
From the time I was 10 years old until I was 15 I went to 4-H camp, for one week, at camp Cornplanter, in McKean County during the first or second week of August. The site was originally Dunkle Corners Civilian Conservation Corps Camp No. ANF-11, which operated in 1935-1936, and then it was run by the YMCA from 1939-1958.
The camp was a pretty rustic place that consisted of 8 residence cabins, a large dining hall, swimming pool and several special service buildings. The cabins were just boards tacked to a frame. The windows had no glass, just screens and the toilets and showers were 50 yards down a path below the cabins. The showers and wash basins had only cold water. Every morning we had to take a cold shower. Each cabin had a center hall with a room where the councilors, really Assistant County Agents, stayed. The rooms on either side had 12 iron cots with web springs and a 3" mattress. The dining hall, swimming pool, and ball field were about 300 yards from the cabins.
Each cabin had kids from different counties in northwestern Pennsylvania. We all had assigned chores to maintain the camp and at the dining hall. One day we set the table, the next we served the food, the next we washed dishes and the next we helped get the meal ready. We would peal potatoes, cut cabbage and clean the kitchen.
One good thing about the camp was the everyone had to learn how to swim or at least try to learn. I had never been in a swimming pool or even tried to swim in a creek or river when I was 10 so it was a big deal for me. I remember struggling for a long time to make it across the pool and the first time I had to jump in the deep end was really scary. But I did learn a lot that first summer.
I think today a major fuss might be made by the parents about the dress code at the pool. Because it was an all male camp, except for the cooks in the dining hall, none of the boys wore swimming suits. At the pool we all went natural and it seemed like it was a normal thing to do at the time. Anyhow that was just part of camp and it was ok.
Besides learning to swim, we spent a lot of time playing baseball and doing craft projects and every night we would have a big campfire, roast hot dogs, play campfire games and tell stories.
That was a great time.
Here it is again, August, a month of hot sultry days that are the real part of summer. A lot of the farm work is done for a while. The hay has been made, the wheat has been cut and threshed and the oats may still be standing in the shock or by now it has been threshed. It is time to go to camp.
From the time I was 10 years old until I was 15 I went to 4-H camp, for one week, at camp Cornplanter, in McKean County during the first or second week of August. The site was originally Dunkle Corners Civilian Conservation Corps Camp No. ANF-11, which operated in 1935-1936, and then it was run by the YMCA from 1939-1958.
The camp was a pretty rustic place that consisted of 8 residence cabins, a large dining hall, swimming pool and several special service buildings. The cabins were just boards tacked to a frame. The windows had no glass, just screens and the toilets and showers were 50 yards down a path below the cabins. The showers and wash basins had only cold water. Every morning we had to take a cold shower. Each cabin had a center hall with a room where the councilors, really Assistant County Agents, stayed. The rooms on either side had 12 iron cots with web springs and a 3" mattress. The dining hall, swimming pool, and ball field were about 300 yards from the cabins.
Each cabin had kids from different counties in northwestern Pennsylvania. We all had assigned chores to maintain the camp and at the dining hall. One day we set the table, the next we served the food, the next we washed dishes and the next we helped get the meal ready. We would peal potatoes, cut cabbage and clean the kitchen.
One good thing about the camp was the everyone had to learn how to swim or at least try to learn. I had never been in a swimming pool or even tried to swim in a creek or river when I was 10 so it was a big deal for me. I remember struggling for a long time to make it across the pool and the first time I had to jump in the deep end was really scary. But I did learn a lot that first summer.
I think today a major fuss might be made by the parents about the dress code at the pool. Because it was an all male camp, except for the cooks in the dining hall, none of the boys wore swimming suits. At the pool we all went natural and it seemed like it was a normal thing to do at the time. Anyhow that was just part of camp and it was ok.
Besides learning to swim, we spent a lot of time playing baseball and doing craft projects and every night we would have a big campfire, roast hot dogs, play campfire games and tell stories.
That was a great time.
Friday, August 04, 2006
Thursday, August 03, 2006
Sources of Conflict
George Weigel's column from the Arlington Catholic Herald, July 20, 2006, page 9, is a prime example of how religion can lead to conflict when it takes priority over faith. Weigel chastises Cardinal McCarrick for his comments about sticking to the "middle" in order to stay in touch with everyone. As I see it faith allows unanswered questions. Faith allows us to think and reason. Cardinal McCarrick is a man of faith who believes that we must communicate with people who have different faiths and different religions.
Weigel is a man of religion who believes that everything is black and white. Anyone who does not believe as Weigel does is wrong. This view has resulted in the major wars between sects of "Christians" and between those Christians and others who propose that their religion is right and everyone else is wrong. These fundamentalist views do not serve humanity well. Those who are of the same mind as Weigel are the same as those who created and perpetuate the Middle-east conflict
Weigel is a man of religion who believes that everything is black and white. Anyone who does not believe as Weigel does is wrong. This view has resulted in the major wars between sects of "Christians" and between those Christians and others who propose that their religion is right and everyone else is wrong. These fundamentalist views do not serve humanity well. Those who are of the same mind as Weigel are the same as those who created and perpetuate the Middle-east conflict
Tuesday, August 01, 2006
Conflict
I started this blog to comment and talk about ordinary life, from growing up to getting old. It was not suppose to be about wars and current events, but I keep getting pulled into talking about Iraq and Israel and foreign aid and the Bush Administration.
Nationalism, religion, and control of resources produce the seeds of conflict. Authoritarian attitudes, lack of tolerance and inability to compromise and a failure to communicate bring about an escalation of disagreements to the point of conflict. Conflict continues so long as both side maintain the belief that they are in the right and both have the resources to continue fighting. When people quit talking, negotiating and trying to understand each other they begin to build fences, verbal and real. When we don't talk and don't try to achieve a middle ground,that allows each side to see that half a loaf is better than no loaf; marriages end in divorce, friendships end in assaults, and national disagreements end in wars.
Nationalism, religion, and control of resources produce the seeds of conflict. Authoritarian attitudes, lack of tolerance and inability to compromise and a failure to communicate bring about an escalation of disagreements to the point of conflict. Conflict continues so long as both side maintain the belief that they are in the right and both have the resources to continue fighting. When people quit talking, negotiating and trying to understand each other they begin to build fences, verbal and real. When we don't talk and don't try to achieve a middle ground,that allows each side to see that half a loaf is better than no loaf; marriages end in divorce, friendships end in assaults, and national disagreements end in wars.
Friday, July 28, 2006
Authoritarian governments
"Authoritarian governments are identified by ready government access to information about the activities of citizens and by extensive limitations on the ability of citizens to obtain information about the government. In contrast, democratic governments are marked by significant restrictions on the ability of government to acquire information about its citizens and by ready access by citizens to information about the activities of government."
Robert G. Vaughn, Transparency- The Mechanisms: Open Government and Accountability" Issues of Democracy
Robert G. Vaughn, Transparency- The Mechanisms: Open Government and Accountability" Issues of Democracy
Wednesday, July 26, 2006
Mideast Crisis
The editorial is worth reading because it makes clear that there is no simple solution to the general Mideast conflict. So long as the Islamic states refuse to recognize Israel, and there is no strong support from the US and western Europe for an independant Palestine, we will have the possiblty of a growing globalconflict.
Mideast crisis also sign of U.S. failure an NCR Editorial
Mideast crisis also sign of U.S. failure an NCR Editorial
Monday, July 24, 2006
Wednesday, July 19, 2006
Crisis in the middle east
When I came back from Pakistan in 1983, I said that World War III would begin in the middle east. We are not at that stage yet but we are very close to a global conflict caused by nationalism driven by religious intolerance.
We are again facing the ineptitude of the British and the U.S. who created Israel by taking land away from the Palestinians. By partitioning the middle east without regard for local realities they perpetuated the sources of conflict rather than ameliorate the problem. Both Syria and Iran seek the destruction of the Jewish state. And both will continue to seek the destruction of a democratic Iraq. They want an Islamic theocratic nationalistic government in both Iraq and in the area that is now controlled by Israel.
Our hope for solving the current crisis is weak at best because the Jewish lobby is such a dominant force in our foreign policy. Both Democrats and Republicans are seeking the Jewish vote in the November elections, so we as a nations will not come down on Israel to stop them from using force rather than diplomacy in dealing with their neighbors.
The justification for creating a Jewish state in the middle of an Islamic territory was weak in 1948, and remains weak today. Yet, the state was created to assuage the guilt of the WWII allies for ignoring the genocide carried out by Nazi Germany.
The solution to the middle east conflict and avoidance of WWIII, if there is to be a solution, must come from enlighten Islamic/Arab governments. The “West” created the problem and is unlikely to be able to solve the diplomatic problem, given the Christian and Jewish fundamentalist leaning of western governments.
We are again facing the ineptitude of the British and the U.S. who created Israel by taking land away from the Palestinians. By partitioning the middle east without regard for local realities they perpetuated the sources of conflict rather than ameliorate the problem. Both Syria and Iran seek the destruction of the Jewish state. And both will continue to seek the destruction of a democratic Iraq. They want an Islamic theocratic nationalistic government in both Iraq and in the area that is now controlled by Israel.
Our hope for solving the current crisis is weak at best because the Jewish lobby is such a dominant force in our foreign policy. Both Democrats and Republicans are seeking the Jewish vote in the November elections, so we as a nations will not come down on Israel to stop them from using force rather than diplomacy in dealing with their neighbors.
The justification for creating a Jewish state in the middle of an Islamic territory was weak in 1948, and remains weak today. Yet, the state was created to assuage the guilt of the WWII allies for ignoring the genocide carried out by Nazi Germany.
The solution to the middle east conflict and avoidance of WWIII, if there is to be a solution, must come from enlighten Islamic/Arab governments. The “West” created the problem and is unlikely to be able to solve the diplomatic problem, given the Christian and Jewish fundamentalist leaning of western governments.
Thursday, July 13, 2006
Random 2
Here is mine:
By RMR
Random as suggested by Damselfish
1. Pick up any book.
2. Go to page 127.
3. Find third sentence
4. Post it on your blog (plus these instructions)
5. Don't choose the book, just pick up the one closest to you.
Here is my line from the book I'm currently reading.
"It was sometimes accompanied, like Hayden's and King's parties, by a clanking escort of cavalry."
Beyond the Hundredth Meridian, Wallace Stegner
By RMR
Random as suggested by Damselfish
1. Pick up any book.
2. Go to page 127.
3. Find third sentence
4. Post it on your blog (plus these instructions)
5. Don't choose the book, just pick up the one closest to you.
Here is my line from the book I'm currently reading.
"It was sometimes accompanied, like Hayden's and King's parties, by a clanking escort of cavalry."
Beyond the Hundredth Meridian, Wallace Stegner
Random
Random as suggested by Damselfish
1. Pick up any book.
2. Go to page 127.
3. Find third sentence
4. Post it on your blog (plus these instructions)
5. Don't choose the book, just pick up the one closest to you.
Here is my line from the book I'm currently reading.
"Catalin Trico and her daughter Sara testified in a custody case that the promiscuous Nan Beech had told them that 'Mr Smith' had fathered the child she was carrying."
The Island at the Center of the World by Russell Shorto
1. Pick up any book.
2. Go to page 127.
3. Find third sentence
4. Post it on your blog (plus these instructions)
5. Don't choose the book, just pick up the one closest to you.
Here is my line from the book I'm currently reading.
"Catalin Trico and her daughter Sara testified in a custody case that the promiscuous Nan Beech had told them that 'Mr Smith' had fathered the child she was carrying."
The Island at the Center of the World by Russell Shorto
Friday, July 07, 2006
Presidents and Polls
While I was listening to George and Laura on the Larry King Show last night it seemed to me that they were disconnected from reality. Larry kept asking them if the low poll ranking bothered them or caused them to loose sleep. Both of them said that they didn’t worry about the polls and that George was going to continue to govern according his convictions. In other words they seemed to say that once you are elected you don’t need to be responsive to the wishes of the majority of the people. They think that a President who listens to the polls would be a failure. It is good that we have the opportunity to change presidents every four years.
George keeps tying the Iraq conflict to the “War on Terror” and contend that we must fight them there or we will need to fight them here. I believe that there was no tie between September 11, 2001 and the Government of Iraq. George created the conflict and linked it to terror. If we had used the resources that are tied up in that misbegotten venture to pursue those who planed a carried out the September attack we would be in a much safer world today.
No question that Saddam was and is a bad cat and he was harmful to the Iraqi people. But we can not justify the invasion of that county based on that. Nor can we justify staying there based on the idea that we are creating a democracy. It seems that George did not learn anything from Viet Nam or from the Russian failure in Afghanistan. The majority in Iraq may want a theocracy. Who are we to tell them that they shouldn’t?
George keeps tying the Iraq conflict to the “War on Terror” and contend that we must fight them there or we will need to fight them here. I believe that there was no tie between September 11, 2001 and the Government of Iraq. George created the conflict and linked it to terror. If we had used the resources that are tied up in that misbegotten venture to pursue those who planed a carried out the September attack we would be in a much safer world today.
No question that Saddam was and is a bad cat and he was harmful to the Iraqi people. But we can not justify the invasion of that county based on that. Nor can we justify staying there based on the idea that we are creating a democracy. It seems that George did not learn anything from Viet Nam or from the Russian failure in Afghanistan. The majority in Iraq may want a theocracy. Who are we to tell them that they shouldn’t?
Friday, June 30, 2006
Mid year 2006
Here it is. The first half of aught six is history. I'll be 69 in a few days. I don't feel old but I use to think that 69 was something that I'd probably never reach. Well I am here and still moving. Life is good. I enjoy each day because it is mine; because I claim it when I get up in the morning; because I don't know what tomorrow will bring; and because our family is good to us.
Tuesday, June 27, 2006
More Weather
Yesterday I talked to a lady who said, "I hope the weather returns to normal soon." I replied, "The weather is seldom ever normal. Most people think that normal is average and the average is made up of variations from average, some more extreme than others. So unless we define normal to be within a certain number of standard deviations, plus or minus, from the mean we don't know what normal is.
She looked at me as though I had totally lost it and said, "Well I hope it quits raining soon."
She looked at me as though I had totally lost it and said, "Well I hope it quits raining soon."
Monday, June 26, 2006
Weather
The drive from Silver Spring to Fairfax last night was through some of the worst dirving conditions that I have ever experienced. Let me change that and say that it was the worst. Rain was falling at the rate of 2" per hour, the sewers were not able to handel the water and the roads became streams.
From Kendal Ct to Viers Mill the street was full, curb to curb, and twice that deep at Viers Mill.
At Connecticut Ave and the Beltway the water pressure in the sewer system had lifted a manhole cover and water was spouting 5 feet in the air through the open manhole.
It had stopped raining by the time we reached I66 but Rt 29 was closed at Pan Am and we had to turn around and get back on 66 to Fairfax.
Route 50 was closed between Eds St. and University Dr.
We got 5 inches of rain Sunday and another 1/2 inch between last night and this morning.
From Kendal Ct to Viers Mill the street was full, curb to curb, and twice that deep at Viers Mill.
At Connecticut Ave and the Beltway the water pressure in the sewer system had lifted a manhole cover and water was spouting 5 feet in the air through the open manhole.
It had stopped raining by the time we reached I66 but Rt 29 was closed at Pan Am and we had to turn around and get back on 66 to Fairfax.
Route 50 was closed between Eds St. and University Dr.
We got 5 inches of rain Sunday and another 1/2 inch between last night and this morning.
Friday, June 23, 2006
Imperial VP
Last night on the CNN Situation Room Dick Cheney provided the best evidence yet of why we need Congress to step up to the task of providing a check on the Presidency. The following exchange between John King and Cheney Shows how Imperial Cheney has become.
JOHN KING: “You're also a human being, though. Your poll ratings are lower than the president's. You have an image that, I think it's fair to say, is not positive with the majority of the American people. That doesn't trouble you at all?”
CHENEY: “There's a great sense of freedom when, in fact, you don't have to worry about the polls. We don't worry about the polls. They go up, the polls go down. The fact of the matter is, we're doing what we think is best for the nation. And that's what the American people elected us to do. I think, ultimately, in the final analysis, that history will judge this president as a very successful, very effective leader. And I'm proud to be part of his team.”
CHENEY: “It's the other thing that's working here, John: I'm not running for anything. My career will end, politically, with this administration. I have the freedom and the luxury -- as does the president -- of doing what we think is right for the country. And the advice I give and the positions I take on issues are based upon that fundamental proposition: We're doing what we're doing in Iraq, in terms of here in the U.S. with the terrorist surveillance program and so forth because we think these are essential policies for the nation to follow. We're not trying to improve our standing in the polls, we're not out there trying to win votes for ourselves. Neither one of us will ever be a candidate again. We're doing what we think is right. And I'm very comfortable with that.”
Cheney seems to be saying that since he was elected he can ignore the wishes of the people. He can act as though he was Emperor or King. He knows best and the hell with the rest.
It would be very bad for the United States if anything bad happened to George Bush in the next 2 ½ years.
JOHN KING: “You're also a human being, though. Your poll ratings are lower than the president's. You have an image that, I think it's fair to say, is not positive with the majority of the American people. That doesn't trouble you at all?”
CHENEY: “There's a great sense of freedom when, in fact, you don't have to worry about the polls. We don't worry about the polls. They go up, the polls go down. The fact of the matter is, we're doing what we think is best for the nation. And that's what the American people elected us to do. I think, ultimately, in the final analysis, that history will judge this president as a very successful, very effective leader. And I'm proud to be part of his team.”
CHENEY: “It's the other thing that's working here, John: I'm not running for anything. My career will end, politically, with this administration. I have the freedom and the luxury -- as does the president -- of doing what we think is right for the country. And the advice I give and the positions I take on issues are based upon that fundamental proposition: We're doing what we're doing in Iraq, in terms of here in the U.S. with the terrorist surveillance program and so forth because we think these are essential policies for the nation to follow. We're not trying to improve our standing in the polls, we're not out there trying to win votes for ourselves. Neither one of us will ever be a candidate again. We're doing what we think is right. And I'm very comfortable with that.”
Cheney seems to be saying that since he was elected he can ignore the wishes of the people. He can act as though he was Emperor or King. He knows best and the hell with the rest.
It would be very bad for the United States if anything bad happened to George Bush in the next 2 ½ years.
Tuesday, June 20, 2006
13 Days
If George Bush had read "13 Days" before he went to War with Iraq we might never have been dragged in to the situation that we now have. If he read it now he might find a way out of the current war. He might avoid conflict with Iran and North Korea.
It would be a good thing if all executive branch, all military and all senators and congressmen were required to read this book before assuming office. We might then make every effort to talk rather than fight.
It would be a good thing if all executive branch, all military and all senators and congressmen were required to read this book before assuming office. We might then make every effort to talk rather than fight.
Friday, April 21, 2006
Thursday, April 13, 2006
My first four cars
This is the same style as my 1954 Plymouth that I bought in may 1958 for $600. Mine was Blue and White.
This is like the 1957 Ford that I bought when I started to work in Meadville.
Here is a picture of the 1962 Rambler American like we had when we moved to Maryland
Here is the 1964 Malbu like the one we had before the 1972 ford
More Cars
Here is a list of Cars that Debbie and Bob have owned in reverse order:
2006 Honda Accord
2004 Honda Accord
1998 Mercedes Benz E320 (leased 2001)
1996 Honda Accord
1989 Pontiac Sunbird
1989 Ford Escort
2006 Honda Accord
2004 Honda Accord
1998 Mercedes Benz E320 (leased 2001)
1996 Honda Accord
1989 Pontiac Sunbird
1989 Ford Escort
Wednesday, April 12, 2006
Cars
This is a 1935 Ford that we had util WWII was over. Ours was Gray.
Here is a 1929 Buick. That is the first car that I can remember that Dad owned.
I was 4 years old when we got the 1935 ford
Wednesday, March 29, 2006
Going to school
I’ve always thought that I got to where I was in life in spite of my education rather than because of it. I started to first grade in 1943 at a little one room school about 1/10 mile from our house. That year there were only 9 students in the school. Besides myself and my brother and sister there were 3 Switzers, 2 Bowersox and 1 Dwyer. Our teacher was mister Hetrick. The school had a big coal stove in the center and did not have any electricity. Two pictures hung in the front of the room, one of George Washington and one of Abraham Lincoln. We had a 48 star U.S. flag and a Pennsylvania State flag.
There was a crockery water jar with a spigot on the side. We had to walk to the neighbors spring, about a quarter mile away, to get water and carry it back in a bucket to fill the jar. We had a dipper to fill the bucket. It was the same dipper that we used to drink from. I don’t think the Health Department would approve to this arrangement today.
The toilets were outhouses, one for the boys and one for the girls.
I spent a lot of time that year listening to the older kids recite their lessons and being taught by the older kids because the teacher was working with someone else. At recess, and we had a lot of recess, we would play out in the school yard sometimes the older boys would knock out flies. Or we would rotate around the bases and then up to bat. In the winter we would sled ride from the neighbors woods down past the school to the creek. We also played Fox and Goose and Warriors Base.
Everyone had to learn and recite poems and the older kids had to read the classics, like “Tale of Two Cities”. I remember the older kids reading Evangeline, The Village Blacksmith, and A Cask of Amontillado.
There was a crockery water jar with a spigot on the side. We had to walk to the neighbors spring, about a quarter mile away, to get water and carry it back in a bucket to fill the jar. We had a dipper to fill the bucket. It was the same dipper that we used to drink from. I don’t think the Health Department would approve to this arrangement today.
The toilets were outhouses, one for the boys and one for the girls.
I spent a lot of time that year listening to the older kids recite their lessons and being taught by the older kids because the teacher was working with someone else. At recess, and we had a lot of recess, we would play out in the school yard sometimes the older boys would knock out flies. Or we would rotate around the bases and then up to bat. In the winter we would sled ride from the neighbors woods down past the school to the creek. We also played Fox and Goose and Warriors Base.
Everyone had to learn and recite poems and the older kids had to read the classics, like “Tale of Two Cities”. I remember the older kids reading Evangeline, The Village Blacksmith, and A Cask of Amontillado.
Friday, March 24, 2006
Tuesday, March 21, 2006
August Vacation
We will now have 2 houses on Sundown Lane. The usual place and the one across the street. That will be good.
Monday, March 20, 2006
Basement Overhaul
Today we started the overhaul of the basement. Victor and Kevin are the final two in our March Madness. The panneling is gone and we are going to bring the whole thing up to code with new studs and pressure treated base plates. Also going to wire it with coax and speaker wire and maybe Cat5.
Wednesday, March 08, 2006
Expertise
Well here I am responding to a tag from DamselFish. A meme (rhymes with theme) tag. I didn’t have any idea what a meme might be so I searched back across the blogs and discovered: an idea, a thought that gets conveyed but may mutate in the process.
The original tag from Paul via eninnej was to state what five resources - online or otherwise - would you point people to, if you wanted to give them an entry into your field of expertise?
First I must first say that I am retired. I was, and for that matter still am, an Economist whose major area of interest is in government policy related to agriculture.
If one were to feel that this was their major calling then to enter this field they mst first have, as a minimum, a BS and Masters or, preferably, a BS and PhD in Economics or Agricultural Economics. I presume that within this level of education you have fields of study in International Trade, International Development, Statistics, Agricultural Policy, Resource Economics, Environmental Policy and Agricultural Finance.
As to Resources:
1. A fundamental online resource can be found in the Core Historical Literature of Agriculture collection at Cornell University's Albert R. Mann Library which offers free electronic access to back issues of AJAE for years 1919 through 1995. To access the 1919-1967 issues of the Journal (at that time called the Journal of Farm Economics) can be accessed here. The Journal's back issues from 1968 through 1995 are available there. Electronic back issues of AJAE for the years 1919 through 1999 are available at www.jstor.com to members who are at institutions that participate in JSTOR's Art & Sciences Complement Collection. A list of participating institutions can be found here.
2. Choices Magazine published by the American Agriculture Economics Association (AAEA) provides current thinking by University and Government Economists on issues related to food, agriculture, resources and development.
3. EuroChoices was launched in 2001 by the Agricultural Economics Society (A.E.S.) and the European Association of Agricultural Economists (EAAE). EuroChoices main aim is to bring current research and policy deliberations on agri-business and rural resource issues to a wide readership, both technical & non-technical.
4. Resources for Economists on the Internet “This guide is sponsored by the American Economic Association. It lists 2,100 resources in 97 sections and sub-sections available on the Internet of interest to academic and practicing economists, and those interested in economics. Almost all resources are also described. Those searching the Internet for economic information might also wish to try the Economics Search Engine (ESE). It indexes 300,000 pages on 10,000 economics web sites from around the world. Searches with it only return their contents”.
5. Agricultural Statistics, USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service -- provides links to the electronic version of this publication starting in 1994
The original tag from Paul via eninnej was to state what five resources - online or otherwise - would you point people to, if you wanted to give them an entry into your field of expertise?
First I must first say that I am retired. I was, and for that matter still am, an Economist whose major area of interest is in government policy related to agriculture.
If one were to feel that this was their major calling then to enter this field they mst first have, as a minimum, a BS and Masters or, preferably, a BS and PhD in Economics or Agricultural Economics. I presume that within this level of education you have fields of study in International Trade, International Development, Statistics, Agricultural Policy, Resource Economics, Environmental Policy and Agricultural Finance.
As to Resources:
1. A fundamental online resource can be found in the Core Historical Literature of Agriculture collection at Cornell University's Albert R. Mann Library which offers free electronic access to back issues of AJAE for years 1919 through 1995. To access the 1919-1967 issues of the Journal (at that time called the Journal of Farm Economics) can be accessed here. The Journal's back issues from 1968 through 1995 are available there. Electronic back issues of AJAE for the years 1919 through 1999 are available at www.jstor.com to members who are at institutions that participate in JSTOR's Art & Sciences Complement Collection. A list of participating institutions can be found here.
2. Choices Magazine published by the American Agriculture Economics Association (AAEA) provides current thinking by University and Government Economists on issues related to food, agriculture, resources and development.
3. EuroChoices was launched in 2001 by the Agricultural Economics Society (A.E.S.) and the European Association of Agricultural Economists (EAAE). EuroChoices main aim is to bring current research and policy deliberations on agri-business and rural resource issues to a wide readership, both technical & non-technical.
4. Resources for Economists on the Internet “This guide is sponsored by the American Economic Association. It lists 2,100 resources in 97 sections and sub-sections available on the Internet of interest to academic and practicing economists, and those interested in economics. Almost all resources are also described. Those searching the Internet for economic information might also wish to try the Economics Search Engine (ESE). It indexes 300,000 pages on 10,000 economics web sites from around the world. Searches with it only return their contents”.
5. Agricultural Statistics, USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service -- provides links to the electronic version of this publication starting in 1994
Wednesday, March 01, 2006
Big Cat and Big Sister
One of my greatest fears when I was young was going to the barn to do the chores after dark, particularly before we got electricity. It was always kind of spooky, even in the daytime and when the light started to get dim outside the shadows really got dark inside. On top of that, if it was windy, the barn would creak and you couldn’t be sure what made the noise. I didn't mind the noise of the livestock moving around and making noise, I knew what those sounds were. It was the unexpected things like a screech owl, a bird, a bat or the wind that caused the hair on the back of my neck to stand up.
It was often my job to put down straw from the strawmow to bed the shed and you couldn’t have a lantern in the strawmow because if it upset the whole barn would be on fire in a few minutes. So you worked in the near dark and there might be anything in the corner where you couldn’t see, or so I thought.
It didn’t help that dad had told me about going down to the barn in the early morning to feed the horses, when he was 10 or 11. He said that he opened the stable door and a big cat jumped of off the steps to the barn floor and came past him out the stable door. He said he thought it was a mountain lion. Well I knew there weren’t suppose to be any mountain lions left in Pennsylvania, but knowing and believing are two different things. And I really did believe that there could be a big cat in the barn.
Also I was working on the barn floor one day and was coming down to the feeding room to get a fork. Unknown to me, Peggy was hiding behind the steps and as I came down she reached through and grabbed my ankle. Well I cleared the 10 feet to the stable door without touching the ground and didn’t stop until I got to the middle of the barnyard. Peggy thought that was great. I didn’t think so. She might have been a big cat.
It was often my job to put down straw from the strawmow to bed the shed and you couldn’t have a lantern in the strawmow because if it upset the whole barn would be on fire in a few minutes. So you worked in the near dark and there might be anything in the corner where you couldn’t see, or so I thought.
It didn’t help that dad had told me about going down to the barn in the early morning to feed the horses, when he was 10 or 11. He said that he opened the stable door and a big cat jumped of off the steps to the barn floor and came past him out the stable door. He said he thought it was a mountain lion. Well I knew there weren’t suppose to be any mountain lions left in Pennsylvania, but knowing and believing are two different things. And I really did believe that there could be a big cat in the barn.
Also I was working on the barn floor one day and was coming down to the feeding room to get a fork. Unknown to me, Peggy was hiding behind the steps and as I came down she reached through and grabbed my ankle. Well I cleared the 10 feet to the stable door without touching the ground and didn’t stop until I got to the middle of the barnyard. Peggy thought that was great. I didn’t think so. She might have been a big cat.
Monday, February 27, 2006
Jockey and Skinny
When I was in 1st grade I had a hat that was a jockey’s cap. It was made of a silky material, had a red bill, and had alternating red and white sections around the cap. I thought it was really great and I wore it every where. However, it created a conflict between me and Mr Hetrick, my first grade teacher. I wore the hat to school and Mr Hetrick started to call me Jockey. Well that was ok for a time or two, but I really didn’t want the kids in the school to pick up the nickname and start calling me Jockey.
I didn’t know what to do about it so I complained to mom about what he was doing. She thought a while and came up with the solution. You see, Mr Hetrick had a nickname that people had hung on him. People referred to him as Skinny Hetrick. Mom said that the next time he called me Jockey I should say “ok Skinny.” I wasn’t sure what would happen, but it worked and he never called me Jockey again.
I didn’t know what to do about it so I complained to mom about what he was doing. She thought a while and came up with the solution. You see, Mr Hetrick had a nickname that people had hung on him. People referred to him as Skinny Hetrick. Mom said that the next time he called me Jockey I should say “ok Skinny.” I wasn’t sure what would happen, but it worked and he never called me Jockey again.
Sunday, February 26, 2006
CLARION AIRPORT
Clarion Airport was named for pioneer pilot Parker D. Cramer, shown beside one of the planes he flew in and out of the original airport, in the shadow of the hangar built there under joint federal and community auspices. The flying field (the first municipally-owned one in the United States) was later named in Cramer's honor after he and his crew were lost on a route-mapping flight over the North Sea. Cramer once flew a plane through this hangar, from end to end.
Air planes and power boat
Sometime in the summer when I was 5 or 6 years old dad and I went to the old Parker Cramer airport at Clarion to meet Bill Culbertson. Bill was the son of Oliver (Twisty) Culbertson who was a contractor in the gas fields in the county. Dad worked for Twisty, off and on, as a driller. Anyhow, Bill owned an airplane and Dad and I got to go for a ride. That was really a big deal for me. We flew down over the farm and back to the airport. At that time there weren’t many kids, or grownups for that matter, who got to fly in a plane.
Bill also owned a power boat that he kept on the Clarion River. It was a big wooden boat with an inboard engine. At that time there weren’t any outboard engines and power boating was for those who had money. One Sunday afternoon dad and I met Bill at the river and went for a ride. That was really “cool.
Bill also owned a power boat that he kept on the Clarion River. It was a big wooden boat with an inboard engine. At that time there weren’t any outboard engines and power boating was for those who had money. One Sunday afternoon dad and I met Bill at the river and went for a ride. That was really “cool.
Saturday, February 25, 2006
Cherry Coke and Old Oak
When I was too small to do many chores on the farm I got to travel around with mom when she went to town. I mostly enjoyed going to town because there was lots to see. Mom knew everyone in town and in all of the shops. Mom really liked to go into the drugstore where she had worked before she was married. She would get a cherry coke that they made from coke syrup, cherry syrup, and soda water. She would buy a chocolate milk for me. If we were in town over lunch we would sit at one of the booths instead of at the fountain and get grilled cheese sandwiches and chocolate milk.
The druggist’s office was in the back of the store and you talked to him through a little window. The place was something like you would expect to see in a little Irish village. The druggist was a little old gnome with wire rim glasses on the bridge of his nose. He wore a white shirt and a vest and looked to me like he was ancient. He was probably 45 or 50.
Sometimes we would visit mom's cousin who worked in the lawyers office. It was a kind of Dickens establishment. There was a lot of oak paneling and railing. The lawyers desk was up on a platform at the rear of the office and he had a big safe up there beside the desk. Helen, mom’s cousin, was the typist and receptionist. Her desk was behind a railing that had a gate near the desk. On the wall behind her desk was a big clock in an oak case with a pendulum. Since the office was mostly quite the ticking of the clock seemed to echo off of the walls. It seemed to make the office a kind of scary place especially when the old lawyer was sitting at his desk peering over his glasses at you.
Helen’s typewriter was a big old mechanical one that made a lot of noise when she typed. She was really good to me she always had a few pennies that she would give to me so I could get some candy at the drugstore.
The druggist’s office was in the back of the store and you talked to him through a little window. The place was something like you would expect to see in a little Irish village. The druggist was a little old gnome with wire rim glasses on the bridge of his nose. He wore a white shirt and a vest and looked to me like he was ancient. He was probably 45 or 50.
Sometimes we would visit mom's cousin who worked in the lawyers office. It was a kind of Dickens establishment. There was a lot of oak paneling and railing. The lawyers desk was up on a platform at the rear of the office and he had a big safe up there beside the desk. Helen, mom’s cousin, was the typist and receptionist. Her desk was behind a railing that had a gate near the desk. On the wall behind her desk was a big clock in an oak case with a pendulum. Since the office was mostly quite the ticking of the clock seemed to echo off of the walls. It seemed to make the office a kind of scary place especially when the old lawyer was sitting at his desk peering over his glasses at you.
Helen’s typewriter was a big old mechanical one that made a lot of noise when she typed. She was really good to me she always had a few pennies that she would give to me so I could get some candy at the drugstore.
Gas wells
After I was 5 or 6 years old, until I was about 10 or eleven, I got to go to work with dad at least one day in the summer time. Mom was not really happy about me going out to the rig, but dad would take me along anyway. The drilling rig was really an impressive and dangerous place, especially for a curious kid. By the time I got to go to the rig they had quit using steam engines to run the machinery and were using natural gas (from another well), diesel or gasoline as fuel.
The rigs that dad worked on were standard rigs that used a bit, attached to a set of jars, on a stem on the end of a long cable. Rotary rigs were not used in our part of the country until after dad quit drilling. The rig consisted of an engine house, the main derrick, a samson post (a big post that held the walking arm), a jack stand, forge, bull wheels, screw, dog house and lazy bench. There was also an assortment of tools; drill bits stems, wrenches, bailers, rope, cable and sledges. When they were drilling the cable was attached to the walking arm by a large screw. As the drill went deeper the driller let out more screw so the drill would contact the bottom of the hole.
Two men worked on the rig: the driller and the tool dresser. It was the tool dressers job to make sure that everything was oiled and greased, the engine was in good repair, help sharpen the bits and help run the tools in and out of the whole when it was time to bail out the mud from the whole or to change bits. The tool dresser was a busy man. The driller was responsible for the entire operation. He had to know when the bit was actually drilling and had to maintain the size and sharpness of the drill bit. If the driller didn’t gage the bits right the hole would get too small and the tools would get stuck. That was not a good thing.
One thing that always excited me was when they sharpened the bit. They would put the bit in the forge and get it red hot then swing it out using a chain block and lay the end of the bit to be sharpened over an anvil. One man would stand on each side with a sledge and strike the face of the bit on his side. They would hammer until the gage was right and then temper the bit in a tub of water.
I had to stay out of the way when they were doing anything other than straight drilling because there was too much stuff that was happening when they pulled the tools or let them back down the hole: belts running ,ropes running, bull wheel turning, etc. It would have been easy to get killed. A lot of the time I just sat on the lazy bench (it was really a big tool box) and watched what was happening.
I have really strong memories of the smell of gas, and grease and oil from around the rig, the thump of the walking arm, the whir of the bull wheel when they let the tools down the hole. I also remember dad baking potatoes for lunch in the forge
Wednesday, February 22, 2006
Horses and the tractor.
Horses and the tractor.
We had a team of horses on the farm until 1942 when dad bought the tractor. The mare was named Queen and the horse (a gelding) was named Logan. Queen was a Belgian bay and Logan was a Percheron. Queen was a fairly gentle beast but Logan was mean, particularly with kids. I remember walking into the feeding room and having Logan snap his jaws at me over the manger. I was never allow to walk behind the hoses in their stalls. My sister did walk behind Logan and he kicked her up against the wall behind the stall.
One day my dad sent my brother down into the pasture field to bring the horses up to the barn. When Logan saw my brother he charged at him at full gallop. My brother ran back toward the barn and dad got between him and Logan who came to a skidding stop right in front of dad.. The horse respected dad but I think he would have killed my brother.
When dad was working in the field with the horses my mother would send a jar of water out to him with one of us kids. I often got to carry the water and if dad was plowing he would sometimes set me on Queen’s back and I would get to ride around the field. If I was sent out to call him in for supper I usually got a ride home.
In April 1942 dad bought his first tractor for $600. It was a little Ford 9N. The Ford-Ferguson 9N tractor began with a gentleman handshake agreement between Henry Ford and Harry Ferguson in October of 1938. Ford manufactured the tractor using Ferguson's 3-point hitch system. The 9N was known as a Ford tractor with the Ferguson system. Ferguson designed the first 3-point hitch system that is used on farm tractors today. His ingenious system combined with his inventive 3-point implements, was a replacement for the horse and the horse-drawn implements. The model 9N was first demonstrated in Dearborn, Michigan, on June 29, 1939. By 1942 they had 25 percent of the tractor market. During the war tractors were not available. In 1949 Dad replaced the tractor with a Ford 8N.
We had a team of horses on the farm until 1942 when dad bought the tractor. The mare was named Queen and the horse (a gelding) was named Logan. Queen was a Belgian bay and Logan was a Percheron. Queen was a fairly gentle beast but Logan was mean, particularly with kids. I remember walking into the feeding room and having Logan snap his jaws at me over the manger. I was never allow to walk behind the hoses in their stalls. My sister did walk behind Logan and he kicked her up against the wall behind the stall.
One day my dad sent my brother down into the pasture field to bring the horses up to the barn. When Logan saw my brother he charged at him at full gallop. My brother ran back toward the barn and dad got between him and Logan who came to a skidding stop right in front of dad.. The horse respected dad but I think he would have killed my brother.
When dad was working in the field with the horses my mother would send a jar of water out to him with one of us kids. I often got to carry the water and if dad was plowing he would sometimes set me on Queen’s back and I would get to ride around the field. If I was sent out to call him in for supper I usually got a ride home.
In April 1942 dad bought his first tractor for $600. It was a little Ford 9N. The Ford-Ferguson 9N tractor began with a gentleman handshake agreement between Henry Ford and Harry Ferguson in October of 1938. Ford manufactured the tractor using Ferguson's 3-point hitch system. The 9N was known as a Ford tractor with the Ferguson system. Ferguson designed the first 3-point hitch system that is used on farm tractors today. His ingenious system combined with his inventive 3-point implements, was a replacement for the horse and the horse-drawn implements. The model 9N was first demonstrated in Dearborn, Michigan, on June 29, 1939. By 1942 they had 25 percent of the tractor market. During the war tractors were not available. In 1949 Dad replaced the tractor with a Ford 8N.
Tuesday, February 21, 2006
Electricity and Telephone
During the 1930s and 1940s much of the country did not have either electric or telephone service. The private power and telephone companies did not provide service to areas outside of towns if the consumers were off the main link to the next town, because the cost of running the lines was much greater than they could recover from the expected revenue. Anyway, they said, most farmers, were too poor to be able to afford electricity.
Rural Electric and Telephone Cooperative were established by the Rural Electric Administration (REA), in the Department of Agriculture, in 1935 under the Roosevelt Administration. At that time only 10 percent of the farms had electricity. By 1939 the REA had helped to establish 417 rural electric cooperatives which, at that time, served 288,000 households. However there were roughly 5.5 million farms and an uncounted number of rural households that weren’t on farms. The work of the REA “encouraged” private companies to electrify the countryside as well. And, by 1939 rural households with electricity had risen to 25 percent.
With the start of WWII copper production was diverted from making cable for electric and phone line to supplying the war industries. New electric and phone lines to rural areas were not built until 1946.
Our farm was one of those that had to wait until the end of the war. No electricity meant no indoor pluming, no electric lights, and a dry cell powered radio. We did have one advantage over a lot of people. We had free natural gas from the well on our farm. The gas lights worked fine as long as you kept enough mantels on hand, they broke easily.
Dad bought an natural gas refrigerator in 1941 so we didn’t have to walk to the spring when we wanted to keep food cold.
The West Penn Electric Co. finely strung wire to our farm in 1946 and Dad hired Bill Clinger to wire the house and barn. I used to hold the flash light for him when he was working in some dark place like under the eves in the attic. Once we had electric we put in a bathroom and remodeled the kitchen with a new sink. Wow!
We also got telephone service, but dad had to pay for the wire and the poles to string the line from the neighbors to our house. Of course the line was a party line with a crank type phone. Our ring was 3 longs and a short. You knew when anyone on the line was getting a call and which family it was by the number of rings. Our neighbor, Helen, had the bad habit of listening to everyone’s calls and that used to really get Dad upset, angry even. He would answer the phone when it was our ring and then say, “OK HELEN, YOU CAN HANG UP NOW.”
To make a call to someone on your line you just used the right number of rings. To call someone of the party line you rang one long to get the operator, then you told here who you wanted to call and where they lived. She would call the operator in the town you were calling and that operator would call the person on her system. Sometimes, if the call was to a distant city, you would have to talk to 2 or 3 operators before you got to right town.
Rural Electric and Telephone Cooperative were established by the Rural Electric Administration (REA), in the Department of Agriculture, in 1935 under the Roosevelt Administration. At that time only 10 percent of the farms had electricity. By 1939 the REA had helped to establish 417 rural electric cooperatives which, at that time, served 288,000 households. However there were roughly 5.5 million farms and an uncounted number of rural households that weren’t on farms. The work of the REA “encouraged” private companies to electrify the countryside as well. And, by 1939 rural households with electricity had risen to 25 percent.
With the start of WWII copper production was diverted from making cable for electric and phone line to supplying the war industries. New electric and phone lines to rural areas were not built until 1946.
Our farm was one of those that had to wait until the end of the war. No electricity meant no indoor pluming, no electric lights, and a dry cell powered radio. We did have one advantage over a lot of people. We had free natural gas from the well on our farm. The gas lights worked fine as long as you kept enough mantels on hand, they broke easily.
Dad bought an natural gas refrigerator in 1941 so we didn’t have to walk to the spring when we wanted to keep food cold.
The West Penn Electric Co. finely strung wire to our farm in 1946 and Dad hired Bill Clinger to wire the house and barn. I used to hold the flash light for him when he was working in some dark place like under the eves in the attic. Once we had electric we put in a bathroom and remodeled the kitchen with a new sink. Wow!
We also got telephone service, but dad had to pay for the wire and the poles to string the line from the neighbors to our house. Of course the line was a party line with a crank type phone. Our ring was 3 longs and a short. You knew when anyone on the line was getting a call and which family it was by the number of rings. Our neighbor, Helen, had the bad habit of listening to everyone’s calls and that used to really get Dad upset, angry even. He would answer the phone when it was our ring and then say, “OK HELEN, YOU CAN HANG UP NOW.”
To make a call to someone on your line you just used the right number of rings. To call someone of the party line you rang one long to get the operator, then you told here who you wanted to call and where they lived. She would call the operator in the town you were calling and that operator would call the person on her system. Sometimes, if the call was to a distant city, you would have to talk to 2 or 3 operators before you got to right town.
Monday, February 20, 2006
Mud and snow
The road past our house was dirt, really slippery clay, until I was 14 years old. In the winter and springtime it would get ruts that were up to the axils on the car. About the only vehicles to get through were the milk truck and the mailman’s Model A Ford. Both of these had wheels that were big enough in diameter that they could make it through the mud. Dad would park our car up at the turn to the main road and we would have to walk up there to the car. Rubber boots were a necessity. The school bus didn’t come down the road when the ruts got deep and I would walk to the turn to catch the bus in the morning.
As soon as the weather got dry enough Dad would hook the tractor to the drag and drag dirt back to fill in the ruts. He only maintained the road from the turn to our house because the township wouldn’t pay him to maintain the road. The section of road between our house and the next farm would be rutted until the Township Supervisors came with the road grader and pulled the dirt from the ditches to the center of the road to fill in the ruts and make a crown on the road so the rain would run off.
In the summer when I was 14 dad convinced the Supervisors to haul in stone and put down a stone base on the road from the turn past our house and the next farm to the next hard road. The stone they brought in was large sand stone that needed to be broken in to smaller size to make the base. My friend and I got jobs with the Township, for $1.00 an hour, to break the rock with sledges. We worked for a month 8 hours a day. Boy, we were in good shape.
The year I was in first grade we had a major snowstorm. The snow drifted across the road and filled it in from bank to bank. We were snowed in for six weeks. Dad had left the car out at the main road and would walk out there to go to work. He carried in any groceries that we needed. The neighbor had a team of horses and he hauled the milk from his cows and ours out to the main road to put it on the milk truck. My oldest sister was going to highschool and she had to walk through the field to get to the main road to ride the school bus. It was during World War II and the whole country was on Daylight Saving Time through the winter, don’t ask me why, and she had to carry a lantern to see where she was going if it was a cloudy night and there was no moon light.
My bother, other sister and I were going to the one room school near our house. The teacher had to walk in from the main road to get to the school. There were only 9 kids in the school and I was the only one in first grade.
As soon as the weather got dry enough Dad would hook the tractor to the drag and drag dirt back to fill in the ruts. He only maintained the road from the turn to our house because the township wouldn’t pay him to maintain the road. The section of road between our house and the next farm would be rutted until the Township Supervisors came with the road grader and pulled the dirt from the ditches to the center of the road to fill in the ruts and make a crown on the road so the rain would run off.
In the summer when I was 14 dad convinced the Supervisors to haul in stone and put down a stone base on the road from the turn past our house and the next farm to the next hard road. The stone they brought in was large sand stone that needed to be broken in to smaller size to make the base. My friend and I got jobs with the Township, for $1.00 an hour, to break the rock with sledges. We worked for a month 8 hours a day. Boy, we were in good shape.
The year I was in first grade we had a major snowstorm. The snow drifted across the road and filled it in from bank to bank. We were snowed in for six weeks. Dad had left the car out at the main road and would walk out there to go to work. He carried in any groceries that we needed. The neighbor had a team of horses and he hauled the milk from his cows and ours out to the main road to put it on the milk truck. My oldest sister was going to highschool and she had to walk through the field to get to the main road to ride the school bus. It was during World War II and the whole country was on Daylight Saving Time through the winter, don’t ask me why, and she had to carry a lantern to see where she was going if it was a cloudy night and there was no moon light.
My bother, other sister and I were going to the one room school near our house. The teacher had to walk in from the main road to get to the school. There were only 9 kids in the school and I was the only one in first grade.
Saturday, February 18, 2006
Monday, February 06, 2006
Gas lights and kerosine lanterns
We went back to the farm over the weekend and stayed with my sister and her husband. It was nice to be able to go to the place where I grew up. It surely is different today, with electricity and central heat.
Until I was ten years old we had natural gas lighting and a gas burning stove in each room. We got a gas Serval refrigerator in 1941. That was a big deal because we didn’t have to carry the milk to the spring house to keep it cold in the spring water.
The gas lights were in the middle of the ceiling and they had mantels that were very fragile. When my brother and I got to jumping around up stairs we always got shouted at because there was a good chance we would break the mantels. If we did that, we wouldn’t have any light in the room below until the mantel could be replaced.
We used a kerosine lantern to make light when we went to the barn in the evening or early morning to milk the cows. The lantern served as our only source of light when we did the chores; feeding the pigs, chickens and calves. Because the lantern didn’t make a lot of light there were a lot of shadows and dark places which made things kind of scary. Dad had told me a story about a big cat, he said it was a mountain lion, that had come out of the barn one morning when he had gone down to feed the horses, that didn’t make me feel any better about going to the barn alone. In fact, I was really spooked, but the work needed to be done and sometimes I was the one who had to do it.
Until I was ten years old we had natural gas lighting and a gas burning stove in each room. We got a gas Serval refrigerator in 1941. That was a big deal because we didn’t have to carry the milk to the spring house to keep it cold in the spring water.
The gas lights were in the middle of the ceiling and they had mantels that were very fragile. When my brother and I got to jumping around up stairs we always got shouted at because there was a good chance we would break the mantels. If we did that, we wouldn’t have any light in the room below until the mantel could be replaced.
We used a kerosine lantern to make light when we went to the barn in the evening or early morning to milk the cows. The lantern served as our only source of light when we did the chores; feeding the pigs, chickens and calves. Because the lantern didn’t make a lot of light there were a lot of shadows and dark places which made things kind of scary. Dad had told me a story about a big cat, he said it was a mountain lion, that had come out of the barn one morning when he had gone down to feed the horses, that didn’t make me feel any better about going to the barn alone. In fact, I was really spooked, but the work needed to be done and sometimes I was the one who had to do it.
Thursday, February 02, 2006
Groundhog day
Groundhog day was one of Dad's favorite days.
Maybe because it was in the middle of Winter.
Happy Groundhogs Day
Maybe because it was in the middle of Winter.
Happy Groundhogs Day
Wednesday, February 01, 2006
Play Time
I spent a lot of time under the side porch playing. From the age of three ‘til I was 9 or 10, that was my favorite place to play. The porch was high enough above the ground that I could walk around when I was a little guy and even when I got a little bigger it was not too uncomfortable. It was dry there and that made it a perfect place to make roads and towns and gravel pits and mines. I could leave my toys there and they would be ok. I don’t remember any of the other kids playing with me. They all seemed to have other things to do.
During World War II the area under the porch became Europe or the south Pacific, depending on how I felt or what was in the news that day. I had some toy cannons, tanks, airplanes and toy soldiers and fought a lot of battles against the Germans and the Japs. Although we didn’t have electricity we did have a radio that ran off a dry cell battery. It seems like the battery lasted quite a while but we might go for a week or two with out a radio because dad didn’t geta replacement.
About the only radio stations we could get were KDKA, Pittsburgh and WCKY Cincinnati, One Ohio. I the afternoon, when I came home from School, I would listen to the serials like Jack Armstrong, Terry and the Pirates, The lone Ranger, Tom Mix, and Sky King. In the evening, after the News with Lowell Thomas, we could listen to the Inner Sanctum, The Green Hornet, The Thin Man, or Dick Tracy.
In the winter time, after grandma died and we had the whole house I played in the room next to kitchen. That was my winter play room for several years. I had stacks of blocks and built a lot of houses and towns.
During World War II the area under the porch became Europe or the south Pacific, depending on how I felt or what was in the news that day. I had some toy cannons, tanks, airplanes and toy soldiers and fought a lot of battles against the Germans and the Japs. Although we didn’t have electricity we did have a radio that ran off a dry cell battery. It seems like the battery lasted quite a while but we might go for a week or two with out a radio because dad didn’t geta replacement.
About the only radio stations we could get were KDKA, Pittsburgh and WCKY Cincinnati, One Ohio. I the afternoon, when I came home from School, I would listen to the serials like Jack Armstrong, Terry and the Pirates, The lone Ranger, Tom Mix, and Sky King. In the evening, after the News with Lowell Thomas, we could listen to the Inner Sanctum, The Green Hornet, The Thin Man, or Dick Tracy.
In the winter time, after grandma died and we had the whole house I played in the room next to kitchen. That was my winter play room for several years. I had stacks of blocks and built a lot of houses and towns.
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